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HUMANS VS. ROBOTS: RETHINKING TAX POLICY FOR A 
MORE SUSTAINABLE FUTURE 
KATHRYN KISSKA-SCHULZE* & KARIE DAVIS-NOZEMACK** 
INTRODUCTION 
Bill Gates wants a robot tax.1  His recent proposal to tax robots that 
replace human workers highlights a growing concern that rapid innovation, 
and automation in particular, will displace many workers and cause signifi-
cant unemployment.2  Research supports automation’s potential for wide-
spread worker displacement.  One study estimates that 47% of U.S. jobs are 
at high risk of replacement by robotic or software automation.3  Similarly, 
McKinsey estimates that by 2030 one third of the human workforce in ad-
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 1.  See Malcolm James, Here’s How Bill Gates’ Plan to Tax Robots Could Actually Happen, 
BUS. INSIDER (Mar. 20, 2017, 11:18 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/bill-gates-robot-tax-
brighter-future-2017-3.   
 2.  See Carl Benedikt Frey & Michael A. Osborne, The Future of Employment: How Suscep-
tible Are Jobs to Computerisation?, 114 TECHNOLOGICAL FORECASTING & SOC. CHANGE 254, 268 
(2017) (analyzing tasks and jobs at risk of automation to calculate total risk in the U.S. economy); 
see also Ryan Calo, Artificial Intelligence Policy: A Primer and Roadmap, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
399, 425–27 (2017) (noting public concerns regarding AI taking over human jobs); Cynthia Estlund, 
What Should We Do After Work? Automation and Employment Law, 128 YALE L.J. 254, 258 (2018) 
(documenting that there are no identifiable industries or sectors that can absorb the number of work-
ers whose jobs will be displaced due to robotics); Lewis D. Solomon, The Microelectronics Revo-
lution, Job Displacement, and the Future of Work: A Policy Commentary, 63 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 
65, 71–75 (1987) (analyzing the impact of machinery on labor).  
 3.  See Frey & Osborne, supra note 2, at 268. 
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vanced economies like the United States may be required to change occupa-
tions and learn new skills to remain employed.4  Rapid automation is pre-
dicted to increase unemployment rates and intensify economic inequality.5 
The current fourth industrial revolution, like the previous three indus-
trial revolutions, is transforming workplaces with machinery improvements.6  
The first industrial revolution’s steam engine is today’s artificial intelligence.  
However, the speed of innovation and the effect on so many diverse indus-
tries is unprecedented.7  Software and robotics are not only automating blue 
collar jobs, but also threaten to replace the white-collar jobs historically 
thought protected.8 
Displaced workers often rely on social aid to ease the transition between 
jobs and to prevent poverty.  The U.S. social safety net provides retirement, 
disability, medical, and unemployment benefits for displaced, retired, and 
disabled workers9 through Social Security, Medicare, and unemployment in-
surance.10  U.S. social safety net programs kept 36 million people out of pov-
erty in 2017.11  Ninety-seven percent of U.S. persons aged sixty- to eighty-
                                                          
 4.  See JAMES MANYIKA ET AL., MCKINSEY GLOBAL INST., JOBS LOST, JOBS GAINED: 
WORKFORCE TRANSITIONS IN A TIME OF AUTOMATION 1, 11 (2017), https://www.mckin-
sey.com/featured-insights/future-of-work/jobs-lost-jobs-gained-what-the-future-of-work-will-
mean-for-jobs-skills-and-wages (estimating size of workforce changes based on various scenarios). 
 5.  See Ryan Abbott & Bret Bogenschneider, Should Robots Pay Taxes? Tax Policy in the Age 
of Automation, 12 HARV. L. POL’Y REV. 145, 147 (2018) (regarding unemployment and economic 
inequality); see also Ronald C. Brown, Made in China 2025: Implications of Robotization and Dig-
italization on MNC Labor Supply Chains and Workers’ Labor Rights in China, 9 TSINGHUA CHINA 
L. REV. 186, 200 (2017) (commenting that automation could trigger a loss of social security bene-
fits). 
 6.  See Brown, supra note 5, at 210 (documenting that the fourth revolution appears to be 
evolving “faster than its predecessors”); see also infra Part I (discussing the evolution of industrial-
ization in the United States). 
 7.  See Brown, supra note 5, at 210. 
 8.  See, e.g., Matthew J. Belvedere, AI Will Obliterate Half of All Jobs, Starting with White 
Collar, Says Ex-Google China President, CNBC (Nov. 13, 2017, 11:35 AM), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2017/11/13/ex-google-china-president-a-i-to-obliterate-white-collar-jobs-
first.html; Pedro Nicolaci da Costa, Robots and Automation Are Going White Collar—But They’re 
Not Here to Steal Your Job Just Yet, BUS. INSIDER (Apr. 1, 2017, 9:41 AM), https://www.busi-
nessinsider.com/white-collar-jobs-and-automation-2017-3; Will Knight, Is Technology About to 
Decimate White-Collar Work?, MIT TECH. REV. (Nov. 6, 2017), https://www.technolo-
gyreview.com/s/609337/is-technology-about-to-decimate-white-collar-work/; Alison DeNisco 
Rayome, Robots Will Steal Your White Collar Office Job, Too: 3 Case Studies, TECHREPUBLIC 
(July 9, 2018, 10:16 AM), https://www.techrepublic.com/article/robots-will-steal-your-white-col-
lar-office-job-too-3-case-studies/. 
 9.  See infra Part II. 
 10.  See Kenneth R. Wing, The Impact of Reagan-Era Politics on the Federal Medicaid Pro-
gram, 33 CATH. U. L. REV. 1, 34 (1983) (noting inclusions to the U.S. social safety net). 
 11.  DANILO TRISI & MATT SAENZ, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, ECONOMIC 
SECURITY PROGRAMS CUT POVERTY NEARLY IN HALF OVER LAST 50 YEARS 4 (2019), 
https://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/9-14-18pov.pdf.   
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nine-years-old collect or will collect Social Security,12 and Medicare, as the 
largest health insurance program,13 provides benefits to 44 million.14  In ad-
dition, unemployment benefits are paid to nearly 2 million Americans annu-
ally.15  Social safety net programs ameliorate poverty, and more than 60% of 
the U.S. population favors expansion of these types of programs.16   
Payroll taxes finance Social Security, Medicare, and unemployment 
programs.17  Payroll taxes, imposed on wages earned, provide 33% of total 
federal revenue.18  As innovation advancements lead toward escalated auto-
mation substitution in the workforce,19 displaced workers will increasingly 
rely on benefits and will be incapable of contributing to the payroll tax that 
funds them.20 
Increased labor substitution resulting from automation innovation 
threatens to undermine the safety net programs.21  This threat is the impetus 
for Mr. Gates’ proposal to tax robots.  His suggestion appears elegant on its 
face, in that it proposes to fill the revenue deficit by taxing the very catalyst 
                                                          
 12.  Policy Basics: Top Ten Facts About Social Security, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y 
PRIORITIES, https://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/8-8-16socsec.pdf (last updated 
Aug. 14, 2019). 
 13.  See Bruce D. Meyer & Derek Wu, The Poverty Reduction of Social Security and Means-
Tested Transfers 7 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 24567, 2018), 
https://www.nber.org/papers/w24567.   
 14.  BEN UMANS & K. LYNN NONNEMAKER, AARP PUB. POLICY INST., THE MEDICARE 
BENEFICIARY POPULATION 1 (2009), https://assets.aarp.org/rgcenter/health/fs149_medicare.pdf 
(providing overview of Medicare program which provides care for 58 million people in the United 
States). 
 15.  See Paul Wiseman, U.S. Unemployment Claims Fall to 220,000, Lowest in 44 Years, USA 
TODAY (Oct. 19, 2017, 10:19 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/econ-
omy/2017/10/19/u-s-unemployment-claims-fall-222-000-lowest-44-years/779522001/ (reporting 
on Labor Department statistics as well as causes and effects of change in statistics). 
 16.  PUB. POLICY POLLING, NATIONAL SURVEY RESULTS (2018), https://www.socialsecuri-
tyworks.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/Nat-Social-Security-March-18-2-Results.pdf (pertaining 
to Social Security and Medicare). 
 17.  See Policy Basics: Federal Payroll Taxes, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES, 
https://www.cbpp.org/research/federal-tax/policy-basics-federal-payroll-taxes (last updated Jun. 
24, 2019) (noting that payroll taxes fund “Social Security, Medicare, and other social insurance 
benefits”); see also Bobby L. Dexter, Tenure Buyouts: Employment Death Taxes and the Curious 
Obesity of “Wages,” 70 U. PITT. L. REV. 343, 351 (2009) (documenting the United States uses 
payroll taxes to pay those entitled to collect Social Security benefits). 
 18.  See Matthew T. Bodie, Employment as Fiduciary Relationship, 105 GEO. L.J. 819, 846 
(2017) (noting the 33% revenue source); see also Sachin S. Pandya, Tax Liability for Wage Theft, 
3 COLUM. J. TAX L. 113, 126 (2012) (documenting that the payroll tax is imposed on both employers 
and employees). 
 19.  See infra Section I.B. 
 20.  See Dexter, supra note 17, at 351–52 (identifying that a similar concern was raised several 
decades ago when Social Security administrators realized that “the level of contributing workers 
would be unable to meet the demand” of baby boomers entering retirement and requesting benefits). 
 21.  See infra Part III. 
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for the lost revenue.  Although robotic taxation presents interesting inquir-
ies,22 we suggest that the robot tax proposal masks the underlying tension 
between innovation tax and employment tax policies, and this long-standing 
tension cannot be resolved with superficial suggestions.  The growing strain 
of automation substitution on the U.S. workforce shows that the social safety 
net is fraying because employment tax and innovation policies are disharmo-
nized. 
This Article will analyze the intersection of U.S. industrialization with 
employment and innovation tax policies.  It will investigate how seemingly 
disconnected tax policies collectively imperil the U.S. social safety net sys-
tem and chart a course towards harmonizing them.  Part I will show how 
industrialization and innovation have historically shaped the U.S. workforce 
and will use this foundation to predict how automation substitution will im-
pact the workforce in the near term.  It will use economic research to validate 
concerns about automation substitution and its negative impact on employ-
ment.  Part II will analyze the social benefit goals underpinning U.S. employ-
ment tax policy and will identify the detrimental effects of automation sub-
stitution on social safety net funding.  Part III will examine how innovation 
policy has supported the third and fourth industrial revolutions but, in so do-
ing, has strayed from the original twin goals of economic development and 
social benefit.  This Part will also show how economic progress has eclipsed 
the importance of social benefits in this policy.  Finally, Part IV will deter-
mine that existing tax literature has not required employment tax and inno-
vation policies to remain faithful to their original social goals.  Consequently, 
this Article will make the case for a new approach to tax policy analysis, one 
that asks fundamental, normative questions.  It will explain how sustainabil-
ity provides an approach for balancing economic and social goals and ad-
dressing intergenerational equity.  It also will show that sustainability will 
not supplant other approaches to tax policy but is sufficiently interdiscipli-
nary and robust to incorporate their lessons. 
I.  INDUSTRIALIZATION AND INNOVATION 
Industrialization denotes more than the historical evolution from manual 
labor to machinery to robotic technology.23  As scholar Ruth Cowan notes, 
                                                          
 22.  See Abbott & Bogenschneider, supra note 5, at 149–50 (suggesting that existing tax poli-
cies must change in anticipation of substantial job loss due to automation substitution); Sami Ah-
med, Cryptocurrency & Robots: How to Tax and Pay Tax on Them, 69 S.C. L. REV. 697, 731–32 
(2018) (discussing advantages and disadvantages of implementing a robot tax); Orly Mazur, Taxing 
the Robots, 46 PEPP. L. REV. 277, 280–82 (2019) (proposing tax and non-tax policy measures to 
improve the future labor market with a focus on balancing capital and labor income). 
 23.  See RUTH SCHWARTZ COWAN, A SOCIAL HISTORY OF AMERICAN TECHNOLOGY 67 
(1997). 
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“Every nook and cranny of social and economic life was implicated in the 
[industrial] process and affected by it . . . young and old, men and women, 
rich and poor, immigrant and native born.”24  Technology has been an essen-
tial cultural component, slowly transforming man-made craftsmanship into a 
digital production.25  Although industrialization transformed labor markets 
throughout history, the fourth industrial revolution is poised to alter the future 
labor pool by replacing human workers in unparalleled fashion.26  The fourth 
revolution’s automation substitution is more than robots replacing human 
workers on manufacturing production lines.27  It encompasses smart robots 
capable of learning and will impact not only manufacturing, but also finance, 
accounting, management, and healthcare previously assumed free from auto-
mation risk.28 
This Part provides context for the current fourth industrial revolution’s 
sweeping changes as well as for the legal regimes in which industrialization 
operates.  To that end, Section I.A offers a historical backdrop for the first, 
second, and third industrial revolutions.  Building upon this historical con-
text, Section I.B identifies the hallmarks of the fourth industrial revolution 
and explores its relationship to automation substitution and worker displace-
ment. 
A.  The Impact of the First, Second, and Third Industrial Revolutions 
There have been three prior industrial revolutions, with a fourth revolu-
tion developing.29  The first revolution transformed farming, cotton, and 
metal working industries with mechanization during the late eighteenth and 
early nineteenth centuries, but occurred primarily in Britain.30  The second 
                                                          
 24.  Id. 
 25.  See id. at 1, 65. 
 26.  See, e.g., Abbott & Bogenschneider, supra note 5, at 159 (noting that improvements in 
computers are resulting in their ability to replace low-skilled workers); Brown, supra note 5, at 189–
90 (discussing the possibility that robots will replace human workers); Chris Fleissner, Note, Inclu-
sive Capitalism Based on Binary Economics and Positive International Human Rights In the Age of 
Artificial Intelligence, 17 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 201, 212 (2018) (offering that the re-
placement of human workers by artificial intelligence would suppress wages and economic growth). 
 27.  See Michael Chui, James Manyika & Mehdi Miremadi, Where Machines Could Replace 
Humans—and Where They Can’t (Yet), MCKINSEY Q. (July 8, 2016), https://www.mckin-
sey.com/business-functions/digital-mckinsey/our-insights/where-machines-could-replace-humans-
and-where-they-cant-yet (using data to predict automation substitution trends by work activity).  
 28.  See id. (noting industries affected by automation substitution). 
 29.  See Solomon, supra note 2, at 65 (discussing the first three Industrial Revolutions); see 
also Peter Miscovich, The Future Is Automated. Here’s How We Can Prepare for It, WORLD ECON. 
FORUM (Jan. 12, 2017), https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2017/01/the-future-is-automated-here-s-
how-we-can-prepare-for-it/ (noting the emergence of the Fourth Revolution in the workforce).  
 30.  See Industrial Revolution, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA (Sept. 4, 2019), https://www.bri-
tannica.com/event/Industrial-Revolution. 
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revolution, from the late nineteenth century until World War I, brought as-
sembly lines, mass production, and large firms to the United States.31  Mi-
croelectronics and computerized technology of the 1980s launched the third 
industrial revolution.32  The fourth revolution is now transforming society 
with digitization, robotization, and cyber systems.33  Each industrial revolu-
tion dramatically altered the workplace.34 
1.  Production: Second Industrial Revolution 
Throughout the colonial period and briefly thereafter, most Americans 
were farmers.35  Hand labor remained prevalent through the end of the Amer-
ican Civil War, constraining domestic industrial production capabilities.36  
After the Civil War, mechanization emerged in the United States, increasing 
speed and output.37  In 1850 there were 116 carpet mills with 6000 workers 
in the United States; just twenty years later, the industry had doubled in 
size.38  As machines replaced hand labor and firms adopted Henry Ford’s 
1913 assembly line,39 production capacity exploded.40 
The second industrial revolution saw a marked labor shift from farm to 
factory, and employment increased from “2.5 to 10 million workers from 
1880 to 1920.”41  Until the late 1800s, the term “unemployment” did not exist 
in the United States.42  Low population and labor scarcity required laborers 
                                                          
 31.  See Solomon, supra note 2, at 65 (tracing the industrial revolutions). 
 32.  See id. (discussing the third industrial revolution). 
 33.  See Brown, supra note 5, at 188–89. 
 34.  See id. at 188 (noting that digitalization is having a widespread and evolving impact on 
production, workers, and labor and employment laws). 
 35.  Susan Pace Hamill, From Special Privilege to General Utility: A Continuation of Willard 
Hurst’s Study of Corporations, 49 AM. U. L. REV. 81, 92 (1999). 
 36.  See History of the United States Industrialization and Reform (1870–1916), 
THEUSAONLINE.COM, http://www.theusaonline.com/history/industrialization.htm (last visited Jan. 
11, 2019). 
 37.  See Ed Crews, Weaving, Spinning, and Dyeing, TREND & TRADITION, Winter 2007, at 84–
87.  
 38.  See Randall L. Patton, A History of the U.S. Carpet Industry, EH.NET, https://eh.net/ency-
clopedia/a-history-of-the-u-s-carpet-industry/ (last visited Jan. 11, 2019). 
 39.  See Sally H. Clarke, Unmanageable Risks: MacPherson v. Buick and the Emergence of a 
Mass Consumer Market, 23 L. & HIST. REV. 1, 11 (2005); see also Kat Eschner, One Hundred and 
Three Years Ago Today, Henry Ford Introduced the Assembly Line: His Workers Hated It, 
SMITHSONIAN MAG.:SMARTNEWS (Dec. 1, 2016), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/smart-
news/one-hundred-and-three-years-ago-today-henry-ford-introduced-assembly-line-his-workers-
hated-it-180961267/ (discussing early employment numbers at Ford). 
 40.  See History of the United States Industrialization and Reform, supra note 36. 
 41.  See Charles Hirschman & Elizabeth Mogford, Immigration and the American Industrial 
Revolution from 1880 to 1920, 38 SOC. SCI. RES. 897 (2009). 
 42.  Cynthia Crossen, Until the Late 1800’s, U.S. Had Never Known Unemployment Woes, 
WALL STREET J. (Dec. 3, 2003, 12:01 AM), https://www.wsj.com/arti-
cles/SB107040655254249400. 
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to exploit land and resources on their own;43 however, industrialization led 
to urbanization.  Between 1870 and 1920, 11 million people relocated to cit-
ies, and most of the 25 million European immigrants also settled in American 
cities.44 
The birth of industry and corporations resulted in clear demarcation 
lines between rich and poor, engendering discontent among the population.45  
For the first time in American history, workers experienced job insecurity.46  
Although manufacturing jobs were abundant, wages were low and job secu-
rity uncertain.47  In response to social and economic influences of the times, 
trade unions took shape.48  
The stock market crash of Black Tuesday catapulted the United States 
into the Great Depression, coinciding with the end of the second industrial 
revolution.49  Before 1929, unemployment was approximately 3.3%; by 1930 
that rate increased to 8.9%, and just one year later jumped to 15.9%.50  By 
1933, the unemployment rate hit its pinnacle of 24.9%.51  To address eco-
nomic turmoil and mass unemployment, federal social insurance was imple-
mented to help restore national economic stability.52 
2.  Technology Boom: Third Industrial Revolution 
Although the shift from farming to urbanization brought about new di-
visions of labor that embraced innovation, advancements during the first and 
                                                          
 43.  See Stanley L. Engerman & Kenneth L. Sokoloff, Once Upon a Time in the Americas: 
Land and Immigration Policies in the New World, in UNDERSTANDING LONG-RUN ECONOMIC 
GROWTH: GEOGRAPHY, INSTITUTIONS, AND THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY 13, 14 (Dora L. Costa & 
Naomi R. Lamoreaux eds., 2011). 
 44.  See America Moves to the City, KHAN ACADEMY, https://www.khanacademy.org/human-
ities/ap-us-history/period-6/apush-gilded-age/a/america-moves-to-the-city (last visited Jan. 11, 
2019). 
 45.  See History of the United States Industrialization and Reform, supra note 36. 
 46.  See Gary Minda, Aging Workers in the Postindustrial Era, 26 STETSON L. REV. 561, 594 
(1996) (noting “great anxiety and job insecurity” of the American workforce as a result of industrial 
revolution). 
 47.  See id. 
 48.  See G. William Domhoff, The Rise and Fall of Labor Unions in the U.S., WHO RULES 
AMERICA?, https://whorulesamerica.ucsc.edu/power/history_of_labor_unions.html (last visited 
Jan. 11, 2019) (providing a history of labor unions in the United States from the 1830s to 1980s). 
 49.  See Joy Sabino Mullane, Perfect Storms: Congressional Regulation of Executive Compen-
sation, 57 VILL. L. REV. 589, 594 (2012) (noting the impact of the stock market crash on the Great 
Depression); see also Bradford L. Smith, The Third Industrial Revolution: Policymaking for the 
Internet, 3 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 1, 2 (2001) (noting the Second Industrial Revolution ended 
in about 1930). 
 50.  Mullane, supra note 49. 
 51.  Id. 
 52.  See infra Part III for further discussion. 
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second revolutions were gradual.53  The introduction of the computer, how-
ever, dramatically changed the speed at which innovation evolved, repeatedly 
doubling computing and technological capabilities over short terms.54 
Computers and the internet propelled twentieth-century society into the 
third industrial revolution.55  Emerging technologies during this period in-
cluded smartphones, Global Positioning System (“GPS”), and mobile broad-
band.56  Computers transformed brick and mortar offices into virtual work-
places.57  Rapid improvements in information technology and mobile devices 
influenced businesses and consumers to become more productive.58  
Evolving technology also changed communication.59  Cell phones pro-
vided “email and web browsing capabilities.”60  Smart phones replaced the 
need for landlines, answering machines, scanners, point and click cameras, 
and digital music players.61  Social technologies like blogs, wikis, and social 
networks transformed communication culturally and organizationally.62  To-
day more than one third of the global population uses some form of social 
                                                          
 53.  See BYRON REESE, THE FOURTH AGE: SMART ROBOTS, CONSCIOUS COMPUTERS, AND 
THE FUTURE OF HUMANITY 21, 25 (2018). 
 54.  See id. at 27–28. 
 55.  See Goncalo de Vasconcelos, The Third Industrial Revolution–Internet, Energy and a New 
Financial System, FORBES (Mar. 4, 2015, 8:50 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/gon-
calodevasconcelos/2015/03/04/the-third-industrial-revolution-internet-energy-and-a-new-finan-
cial-system/#5aa121b3271a (documenting that the third industrial revolution emerged in the mid-
1990s). 
 56.  See Annalisa Quinn, Move over Millennials, Here Comes ‘iGen’ . . . or Maybe Not, NPR 
(Sept. 17, 2017, 7:01 AM), https://www.npr.org/2017/09/17/548664627/move-over-millennials-
here-comes-igen-or-maybe-not (discussing the impact of Generation Z); see also Will McLennan, 
Great Life-Improving Inventions of the 2000s, THERICHEST (Nov. 23, 2013), https://www.therich-
est.com/business/technology/the-top-10-life-improving-inventions-of-the-2000s/ (documenting 
some of the greatest technological inventions of the 2000s). 
 57.  See Nancy J. King, Labor Law for Managers of Non-Union Employees in Traditional and 
Cyber Workplaces, 40 AM. BUS. L.J. 827, 830 (2003) (further discussing cyber and virtual work-
spaces).   
 58.  See Clayton Browne, How Have Computers Changed the Workplace?, CAREER TREND 
(July 5, 2017), https://careertrend.com/computers-changed-workplace-2197.html.  
 59.  See Ric Simmons, Why 2007 Is Not Like 1984: A Broader Perspective on Technology’s 
Effect on Privacy and Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 531, 568 
(2007) (noting that “technology has changed the way we communicate and store information”). 
 60.  Robert A. Pikowsky, The Need for Revisions to the Law of Wiretapping and Interception 
of Email, 10 MICH. TELECOMM. TECH. L. REV. 1, 2–3 (2003). 
 61.  Tim Stenovec, 13 Things the Smartphone Has Made Obsolete, BUS. INSIDER (Nov. 21, 
2015, 9:56 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/13-things-the-smartphone-has-made-obsolete-
2015-11. 
 62.  See Martin Harrysson, The Evolution of Social Technologies, MCKINSEY Q. (June 29, 
2016), https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/high-tech/our-insights/the-evolution-of-social-tech-
nologies (discussing the incorporation of social network culture in business models).  
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media platform—Facebook, Snapchat, Twitter, or Instagram—to share infor-
mation.63  The Internet also introduced retail electronic commerce (“e-com-
merce”)64 and eased barriers to global business.65  Thanks in large part to 
Amazon.com, e-commerce is expected to comprise 17% of U.S. retail sales 
by 2022.66   
Although the speed at which technological advancements occurred dur-
ing the third industrial revolution was previously unmatched, society is now 
on the brink of even more explosive innovations with automation and robot-
ics.67  The momentum of today’s fourth industrial revolution sets the stage 
for profound transformations in the way society works and lives.68  As tech-
nology author Byron Reese documented in his recent book, The Fourth Age: 
Smart Robots, Conscious Computers, and the Future of Humanity, “while it 
took us almost five thousand years to get from the abacus to the iPad, twenty-
five years from now, we will have something as far ahead of the iPad as it is 
ahead of the abacus.”69 
B.  The Impact of Automation Innovation and Robotics in the Fourth 
Industrial Revolution 
Technologists foresee the fourth industrial revolution as the time period 
for which artificial intelligence and robots facilitate change fundamentally 
different in type, speed, and reach from the incremental machinery improve-
ments of the previous revolutions.70  Genetic engineering, artificial intelli-
gence, robotics, and three-dimensional (“3D”) printing are opportunities for 
                                                          
 63.  Audrey Willis, 6 Ways Social Media Changed the Way We Communicate, HIGHER EDUC. 
MARKETING J. (Aug. 15, 2017), http://circaedu.com/hemj/how-social-media-changed-the-way-we-
communicate/.  
 64.  See Tapio Puurunen, The Judicial Jurisdiction of States over International Business-to-
Consumer Electronic Commerce from the Perspective of Legal Certainty, 8 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. 
& POL’Y 133, 136 (2002) (discussing the rise of electronic commercial retail). 
 65.  See Kathryn Kisska-Schulze, The Future of E-Mail Taxation in the Wake of the Expiration 
of the Internet Tax Freedom Act, 51 AM. BUS. L.J. 315, 321 (2014) (discussing how the rise of 
electronic commercial retail has enabled customers to remotely pass national borders). 
 66.  Daniel Keyes, E-Commerce Will Make Up 17% of All U.S. Retail Sales by 2022—and One 
Company is the Main Reason, BUS. INSIDER (Aug. 11, 2017, 11:12 AM), http://www.busi-
nessinsider.com/e-commerce-retail-sales-2022-amazon-2017-8; see also Note, Online Retailers 
Battle with Sales Tax: A Physical Rule Living in a Digital World, 46 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 673, 678 
(2013) (noting the date of Amazon’s incorporation). 
 67.  See Brown, supra note 5, at 209–10 (documenting that the fourth revolution appears to be 
evolving faster than its predecessors). 
 68.  See id. at 187 (noting that the technology of the fourth industrial revolution will radically 
change industry, production value chains, and business models). 
 69.  REESE, supra note 53, at 30. 
 70. See UNITED NATIONS ECON. & SOC. COMM’N FOR W. ASIA (UNESCWA), FOURTH 
INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION: IMPACT OF THE FOURTH INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION ON DEVELOPMENT 
IN THE ARAB REGION 3–4 (2019), https://www.unescwa.org/sites/www.unescwa.org/files/publica-
tions/files/impact-fourth-industrial-revolution-development-arab-region-english.pdf (discussing 
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humans to even more closely collaborate with machinery.71  The human-ma-
chine alliance is becoming ubiquitous globally and a daily experience for 
many.  The technologies of the fourth industrial revolution have a “systems 
level impact” on nearly all aspects of human lives; this impact is in contrast 
to the breadth of previous revolutions.72  For example, one in six Americans 
owns a voice-activated smart speaker.73  Domino’s successfully delivered its 
first pizza via drone, and Amazon added 55,000 robots in 2017 to automate 
internal operations.74  While the fourth industrial revolution is indeed radical 
in many ways, the focus of this Article is automation substitution for workers. 
Recent studies suggest that automation innovation may be a catalyst for 
job displacement in the future.  A recent study estimates that 47% of U.S. 
jobs are at high risk for automation replacement.75  While jobs in lower-risk 
categories include management, business, education, and media performance 
positions,76 occupations exhibiting a high probability of automation substitu-
tion include sales, services, construction, transportation, office administra-
tion and material moving positions.77  In assessing automation risk, the study 
                                                          
the speed, breadth, impact and disruption of the fourth industrial revolution and contrasting it with 
previous industrial revolutions) [hereinafter UNESCWA]; see also James Pethokoukis, We Aren’t 
Doomed: My Review of “The Fourth Age: Smart Robots, Conscious Computers, and the Future of 
Humanity” by Byron Reese, AEI (Oct. 19, 2018), https://www.aei.org/economics/we-arent-
doomed-my-review-of-the-fourth-age-smart-robots-conscious-computers-and-the-future-of-hu-
manity-by-byron-reese/ (discussing the fourth industrial revolution in the context of Reese’s book). 
 71.  See Klaus Schwab & Richard Samans, Preface to WORLD ECON. FORUM, THE FUTURE OF 
JOBS: EMPLOYMENT, SKILLS AND WORKFORCE STRATEGY FOR THE FOURTH INDUSTRIAL 
REVOLUTION v (2016), http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_Future_of_Jobs.pdf (specifying the 
various types of technology propelling us into the fourth industrial revolution); see also Insights 
Contributor, How The World’s Top Executives Are Approaching The Fourth Industrial Revolution, 
FORBES INSIGHTS (Jan. 22, 2018, 9:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/insights-
deloitte/2018/01/22/how-the-worlds-top-executives-are-approaching-the-fourth-industrial-revolu-
tion/#5ba399547abd (noting that the fourth industrial revolution will allow for collaboration be-
tween human and machine). 
 72.  See UNESCWA, supra note 70, at 4–5.  
 73.  Following Holiday Surge, One in Six Americans Owns a Voice-Activated Smart Speaker, 
NPR (Jan. 10, 2018), https://www.npr.org/about-npr/577007267/jan-2018-smart-audio-report.  
 74.  See Erin Winick, Amazon’s Investment in Robots Is Eliminating Human Jobs, MIT TECH. 
REV. (Dec. 4, 2017), https://www.technologyreview.com/the-download/609672/amazons-invest-
ment-in-robots-is-eliminating-human-jobs/ (discussing Amazon’s investment in robotics); see also 
Andrew Meola, Shop Online and Get Your Items Delivery by a Drone Delivery Service: The Future 
Amazon and Domino’s Have Envisioned for Us, BUS. INSIDER (July 18, 2017, 12:30 PM), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/delivery-drones-market-service-2017-7 (analyzing drone delivery 
in the retail industry). 
 75.  See Frey & Osborne, supra note 2, at 268.  
 76.  See id. at 266–67 (further noting that while media occupations are vastly different from 
those of chief executives, they require a wide range of tasks involving social intelligence and thus 
unlikely to be subject to computerization). 
 77.  See id. at 266–68.  
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found a correlation between high-risk positions and worker wages, forecast-
ing that automation will be a main substitute for low-skilled and low-wage 
jobs in the future.78 
A 2017 McKinsey Global Institute study estimated that 400 to 800 mil-
lion persons globally may be displaced by automation by 2030.79  Of that 
total, 75 to 375 million individuals may have to change occupations or learn 
new skills to remain employable.80  For advanced economies like the United 
States and Germany, one third of the workforce may be affected by 2030.81  
Automation substitution also threatens white collar jobs.82  Tasks previously 
conducted by highly-skilled persons but can now be augmented by automa-
tion83 include accounting, law, and medicine.84 
In 2017, the Pew Research Center found that 72% of Americans worry 
that “robots and computers are capable of doing many jobs that are currently 
done by humans.”85  Seventy-five percent felt that the U.S. economy will not 
create enough new and better-paying human jobs if robots and computers 
displace human workers in the future.86  Although only 30% of participants 
found it somewhat likely that their own jobs would be replaced by robots or 
computers during their lifetime, participants viewed certain professions as 
being at greater risk, including fast food workers, insurance claims proces-
sors, software engineers, and legal clerks.87 
While these studies prompt important questions about the impact of au-
tomation substitution on the workforce, this paper does not support that every 
robot introduced into the labor market will displace a human worker.  Robots 
produce two different economic effects: a displacement effect and a produc-
tivity effect.88  Automation innovation displaces workers, but it also creates 
                                                          
 78.  See id. at 269. 
 79.  See Manyika et al., supra note 4, at 11.  
 80.  See id. 
 81.  See id.  In China, for example, the percent of the workforce forecast to require an occupa-
tional change is upwards of 13%, while in India that percentage drops to 6%.  Id.  
 82.  See Belvedere, supra note 8. 
 83.  See id.  
 84.  See Nicolaci da Costa, supra note 8. 
 85.  Aaron Smith & Monica Anderson, Automation in Everyday Life, PEW RES. CTR. (Oct. 4, 
2017), http://www.pewinternet.org/2017/10/04/automation-in-everyday-life/.  
 86.  See id. 
 87.  See id.  The report notes that 77% of respondents indicated that fast food workers are at 
greater risk of automation, 65% highlighted insurance claims processors to be at risk; 53% viewed 
software engineers as being at greater risk, and 50% noted legal clerks as being at risk for substitu-
tion.  Other highlighted professions include: construction workers (42%), teachers (36%), and 
nurses (20%).  Id.  
 88.  See Daron Acemoglu & Pascual Restrepo, Robots and Jobs: Evidence from U.S. Labor 
Markets 2–3 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 23285, 2017), 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w23285. 
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a productivity effect that drives up labor and wages in other areas of the econ-
omy.89  Just as robot usage in one industry has labor and wage effects in other 
industries, it also ripples through related economies.90  As economics schol-
ars note, 
[E]ven if the presumed technological advances materialize, there 
is no guarantee that firms would choose to automate; that would 
depend on the costs of substituting machines for labor and how 
much wages change in response to this threat.  Second, the labor 
market impacts of new technologies depend not only on where they 
hit but also on the adjustment in other parts of the economy.  For 
example, other sectors and occupations might expand to soak up 
the labor freed from the tasks that are now performed by machines, 
and productivity improvements due to new machines may even ex-
pand employment in affected industries.91 
Even accounting for the productivity effect, scholars predict increased robot 
usage will have a negative impact on employment and wages92 and that au-
tomation substitution significantly targets low-skilled workers.93   
Society is only at the dawn of the fourth industrial revolution, and the 
effect of automation substitution on the workforce is foreboding.  Each of the 
prior revolutions increased worker productivity.  This fourth industrial revo-
lution, however, is setting up to be vastly different from its predecessors in 
both speed and breadth of labor substitution, prompting concerns about future 
job displacement and the negative impact of automation substitution on 
wages.  Workforce unease, and the resulting social impact that may ensue, 
has led prominent figures like Bill Gates to propose a tax on robots that take 
over human jobs.94 
                                                          
 89.  See id. 
 90.  See id. at 4 (“[I]n practice, the more intensive use of robots in a commuting zone reduces 
the costs of the products now produced using robots in the entire US economy, and thus trigger 
some expansion of employment and wages in other commuting zones.  Our model, by incorporating 
trade between commuting zones, enables us to quantify this effect.”) 
 91.  Id. at 1–2. 
 92.  See id. at 36 (“[I]f the spread of robots proceeds as expected by experts over the next two 
decades . . . the future aggregate implications of the spread of robots could be much more sizable.” 
(citing ERIK BRYNJOLFSSON & ANDREW MCAFEE, THE SECOND MACHINE AGE: WORK, 
PROGRESS, AND PROSPERITY IN A TIME OF BRILLIANT TECHNOLOGIES (2014))). 
 93.  See Georg Graetz & Guy Michaels, Robots at Work, 100 REV. ECON. & STAT. 753, 766 
(2018); see also Acemoglu & Restrepo, supra note 88, at 6 (“Most closely related to our work is 
the pioneering paper by Graetz and Michaels (2015).  Focusing on the variation in robot usage 
across industries in different countries, they estimate that industrial robots increase productivity and 
wages, but reduce the employment of low-skill workers.”). 
 94.  See James, supra note 1. 
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The United States has historically encouraged innovation because of the 
social and economic spillover effects.95  However, as society evolved to-
wards greater human-machine alliances, innovation tax policy began to pro-
mote the economic gains of innovation at the expense of social benefits.96  
While the fundamental premise behind U.S. employment tax policy is the 
promotion of social general welfare, worker displacement due to automation 
substitution could result in our country’s inability to meet benefit demands.97  
The intersection of technology and existing legal regimes threatens to under-
mine rather than improve the human condition.  The next two Parts examine 
the foundations of the legal regimes at issue, employment tax and innovation 
tax policies, to expose how these policies function together during the fourth 
industrial revolution. 
II.  EMPLOYMENT TAX POLICY AND INDUSTRIALIZATION 
The federal employment tax (“payroll tax”) is the major revenue source 
for social insurance contributions in the United States, including Social Se-
curity, Medicare, and unemployment.98  The payroll tax is imposed on wages 
earned by employees via the Federal Insurance Contributions Act (“FICA”)99 
and Medicare and on the self-employed via the Self-Employed Contributions 
Act (“SECA”).100  The tax promotes social responsibility by shielding retir-
ees, disabled, and survivors of deceased workers against poverty and finan-
cial dependency.101  In addition, the federal unemployment tax (“FUTA”)102 
is assessed on employers and provides financial benefits to involuntarily un-
employed workers.103 
                                                          
 95.  See infra text accompanying notes 157–198. 
 96.  See infra Part III.C. 
 97.  See Abbott & Bogenschneider, supra note 5, at 170; see also Dexter, supra note 17, at 
351–52 (noting that a parallel concern was raised when Social Security administrators realized that 
the level of contributing workers was unable to meet the demands of baby boomers entering retire-
ment and requesting benefits several decades ago; this issue has raised the concern that baby boom-
ers will bankrupt Social Security). 
 98.  See MAUREEN ANNE GRIFFIN, CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, PAYROLL TAX, FEDERAL 320 
(1999), https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/69526/1000540-Payroll-Tax-Fed-
eral.PDF.  
 99.  I.R.C. §§ 3101–28 (2012). 
 100.  Id. §§ 1401–03. 
 101.  See Joel F. Handler, The “Third Way” or the Old Way?, 48 KAN. L. REV. 765, 768 (2000) 
(noting that France and Sweden are more effective at “reducing poverty and minimizing dependency 
among lone-parent families than the United States”). 
 102.  I.R.C. §§ 3301–11. 
 103.  See Griffin, supra note 98, at 321. 
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Since passage of the Social Security Act in 1935,104 the United States 
has depended on employment tax revenue generated by the working class to 
fund social security payments to retirees.105  Displacement of wage earners 
due to automation substitution could result in the inability to meet benefit 
demands.106 
A.  Origin and Purpose of the Federal Employment Tax 
Congress adopted the beginnings of what would later be known as the 
Old Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance program (“OASDI”)  in 1935, 
as part of the Social Security Act,107 and substantially amended it in 1939108 
before it had been fully implemented.109  President Franklin D. Roosevelt 
promoted social insurance to restore U.S. economic stability during the Great 
Depression.110  The legislation included provisions for old-age and unem-
ployment benefits.111  The Act was later amended to include child dependent, 
survivor, and disability benefits,112 and, in 1965, health insurance (Medicare) 
was incorporated into the program.113 
                                                          
 104.  Social Security Act, ch. 531, 49 Stat. 620 (1935) (codified as amended in scattered sections 
of 42 U.S.C.). 
 105.  See Policy Basics: Where Do Federal Tax Revenues Come From?, CTR. ON BUDGET & 
POL’Y PRIORITIES, https://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/PolicyBasics_WhereD-
oFederalTaxRevsComeFrom_08-20-12.pdf (last updated June 20, 2019) (documenting that 35% of 
all federal revenue is generated from payroll taxes to fund Social Security, Medicare and unemploy-
ment insurance). 
 106.  See Abbott & Bogenschneider, supra note 5, at 170; see also Dexter, supra note 17, at 
351–52 (noting that a parallel concern was raised when Social Security administrators realized that 
the level of contributing workers was unable to meet the demands of baby boomers entering retire-
ment and requesting benefits several decades ago, which some feared could bankrupt social secu-
rity). 
 107.  Social Security Act, ch. 531, 49 Stat. 620. 
 108.  Social Security Act Amendments of 1939, ch. 666, § 205(a), 53 Stat. 1360, 1368. 
 109.  See Larry DeWitt, The Development of Social Security in America, 70 SOC. SECURITY 
BULL., Aug. 2010, at 1, 1–2, https://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/ssb/v70n3/v70n3p1.pdf (defining the 
purpose of social insurance); see also John R. Kearney, Social Security and the “D” in OASDI: The 
History of a Federal Program Insuring Earners Against Disability, 66 SOC. SECURITY BULL., Aug. 
2006, at 1, 3, https://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/ssb/v66n3/v66n3p1.pdf; Susan L. Waysdorf, 
Fighting for Their Lives: Women, Poverty, and the Historical Role of United States Law in Shaping 
Access to Women’s Health Care, 84 KY. L.J. 745, 805 (1995–96) (documenting a history of the 
Social Security Act). 
 110.  See Kearney, supra note 109, at 2. 
 111.  Id. at 3. 
 112.  The Social Security Act has been amended in substantial ways many times, including in 
1939, 1950, 1952, 1954, 1956, 1958, 1960, 1961, 1965, 1966, 1967, 1969, 1971. 1972, 1973, 1977, 
1980, 1981, 1983, 1984, 1985, 1986, 1987, 1989, 1990, 1993, 1994, 1996, 1999, 2000, and 2004.  
The major changes to dependent benefits were in 1939, with the Social Security Act Amendments 
of 1939, ch. 666, § 205(a), 53 Stat. 1360, 1368.  The major changes to disability benefits were in 
1954, with the Social Security Act Amendments of 1954, Pub. L. 83-761, 68 Stat. 1052. 
 113.  Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, § 121(a), 79 Stat. 286, 343 (1965) 
(codified as amended as 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (2012)). 
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The Social Security Act was designed to ease deprivation and hardship 
during the depression and its aftermath,114 as identified in its objectives: 
(1) Unemployment insurance is intended to offer workers income 
maintenance during periods of unemployment due to lack of work, 
providing partial wage replacement as a matter of right; (2) it is to 
help maintain purchasing power and to stabilize the economy; and 
(3) it is to help prevent dispersal of the employer’s trained labor 
force, the sacrifice of skills, and the breakdown of labor standards 
during temporary unemployment.115   
Although the Act’s purpose was to provide welfare assistance, the federal 
government sought long-term solutions to prevent poverty and economic se-
curity for an increasingly aging population.116  The second industrial revolu-
tion resulted in unfamiliar and unwelcome recessions, layoffs, and corporate 
closures.117  Government funding to protect employees and dependents 
against lost wages, disability, and death while supporting an increasingly ma-
turing population was the impetus behind the imposition of the payroll tax.118  
The payroll tax includes the FICA tax paid by employers and employees, and 
the FUTA tax paid by employers only.119  
1.  The Federal Insurance Contributions Act (“FICA”) 
In 1937, the payroll tax was established as a contribution plan split be-
tween employees and employers on most wages paid to employees.120  To-
day, the FICA tax sustains two major programs: OASDI and Medicare.121  At 
                                                          
 114.  See Nancy J. Altman, The Striking Superiority of Social Security in the Provision of Wage 
Insurance, 50 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 109, 113 (2013). 
 115.  Daniel N. Price, Unemployment Insurance, Then and Now, 1935–85, 48 SOC. SECURITY 
BULL., Oct. 1985, at 22, 24, https://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/ssb/v48n10/v48n10p22.pdf. 
 116.  See Altman, supra note 114, at 113 (documenting poverty prevention); see also DeWitt, 
supra note 109, at 1–2 (noting economic security). 
 117.  See Historical Background and Development of Social Security, SOC. SECURITY ADMIN, 
https://www.ssa.gov/history/briefhistory3.html (last visited Jan. 11, 2019). 
 118.  See Altman, supra note 114, at 113–14 (discussing the legislative history and purpose of 
the Social Security Act of 1935 and its progeny).   
 119.  Understanding Employment Taxes, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., https://www.irs.gov/busi-
nesses/small-businesses-self-employed/understanding-employment-taxes (last updated Jan. 16, 
2020).  
 120.  See Benjamin A. Templin, Social Security Reform: The Politics of the Payroll Tax, 32 
QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 1, 11 (2013) (documenting that “the payroll tax was implemented in 1937”); 
see also I.R.C. §§ 3101–28 (2012) (covering the FICA); Patricia E. Dilley, Through the Doughnut 
Hole: Reimagining the Social Security Contribution and Benefit Base Limit, 62 ADMIN. L. REV. 
367, 383 (2010) (noting that the payroll contribution plan was imposed on both employees and 
employers).  
 121.  See Richard Winchester, Working for Free: It Ought to Be Against the (Tax) Law, 76 MISS. 
L.J. 227, 245–46 (2006).  However, prior to the enactment of Medicare, the tax only subsidized 
OASDI.  See Templin, supra note 120, at 11; see also Steve Anderson, A Brief History of Medicare 
in America, MEDICARERESOURCES.ORG (Sept. 1, 2019), https://www.medicareresources.org/basic-
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its inception, a 2% Social Security tax was imposed on and shared between 
employers and employees on the first $3000 of taxable wages, making up 
less than 2% of the total U.S. Gross Domestic Product (“GDP”) at that 
time.122  Both the rate and taxable minimum have progressively risen to a 
current shared rate of 12.4% up to a $137,700 wage cap, contributing to 
nearly 6% of the total U.S. GDP.123  Most wages earned by employees up to 
the scheduled ceiling are subject to the FICA tax.124  
Social Security OASDI benefits are now the chief income source for the 
majority of U.S. senior citizens and provide benefits to retired persons, sur-
vivors of deceased workers, and the disabled.125  Absent these benefits, an 
additional 8% (for a total of 24%) of the U.S. population would live below 
the poverty line.126 
In addition to funding Social Security, FICA also funds Medicare ben-
efits.127  Established by Congress in 1965, Medicare is funded by a 2.9% 
                                                          
medicare-information/brief-history-of-medicare/ (documenting that Medicare health coverage was 
not signed into law until after 1965). 
 122.  See Templin, supra note 120, at 11; see also Payroll Tax Rates: 1937 to 2019, TAX POL’Y 
CTR. (July 15, 2019) https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/statistics/payroll-tax-rates (noting that the 
2% rate was not increased until 1950); What Are the Major Federal Payroll Taxes, and How Much 
Money Do They Raise?, TAX POL’Y CTR., http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/briefing-book/what-are-
major-federal-payroll-taxes-and-how-much-money-do-they-raise (last visited Jan. 11, 2019) (not-
ing 1940 as date of first recording). 
 123.  See Templin, supra note 120, at 11 (documenting the steady increase in rate and tax max-
imum); see also Research, Statistics & Policy Analysis, OASDI and SSI Program Rates & Limits, 
2020, SOC. SECURITY ADMIN., (Oct. 2019), https://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/quick-
facts/prog_highlights/index.html (listing tax rate and maximum taxable earnings as of 2020); Source 
of Revenue as Share of GDP, TAX POL’Y CTR. (July 18, 2019), http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/sta-
tistics/source-revenue-share-gdp (providing receipts by source as a percentage of GDP). 
 124.  See Publication 15 (2020), (Circular E), Employer’s Tax Guide, INTERNAL REVENUE 
SERV., https://www.irs.gov/publications/p15#en_US_2020_publink1000202402 (last updated Mar. 
13, 2020) (explaining that “Social security and Medicare taxes have different rates and only the 
social security tax has a wage base limit.”); see also John Spencer Treu, Less Is More: Applying a 
Modified Reasonable Compensation Standard to Eliminate the Inconsistencies Among the Payroll 
Tax Bases and the Net Investment Income Tax Base Under the Affordable Care Act, 92 NEB. L. 
REV. 586, 589–90 (2014).  
 125.  See SOC. SEC. ADMIN., FAST FACTS & FIGURES ABOUT SOCIAL SECURITY, 2017 ii (2017), 
https://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/chartbooks/fast_facts/2017/fast_facts17.pdf (noting that 62% of 
the elderly “received at least half of their income from Social Security in 2015”); see also Francine 
J. Lipman, (Anti)Poverty Measures Exposed, 21 FLA. TAX REV. 389, 439–50 (2017) (discussing 
and providing statistics for the role Social Security benefits play in limiting poverty). 
 126.  Lipman, supra note 125, at 439 (citing KATHLEEN SHORT, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, P60-
254, THE SUPPLEMENTAL POVERTY MEASURE: 2014 9 (2015), https://www.census.gov/con-
tent/dam/Census/library/publications/2015/demo/p60-254.pdf)).  
 127.  See Kirsten Harrington, Employment Taxes: What Can the Small Businessman Do?, 10 
AKRON TAX J. 61, 61 (1993). 
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employment tax rate shared between employers and employees (1.45% im-
posed on each) on all qualified earnings without a cap.128  In 2018, Medicare 
accounted for 15% of the total federal budget.129  The initial Medicare budget 
was about $10 billion for 19 million participants, and is now $705.9 billion 
for 60.6 million participants.130  Today it is the largest health insurance pro-
gram in the United States and, unlike Social Security benefits, its benefits are 
distributed equally to qualifying taxpayers without regard to lifetime wages 
earned.131 
2.  The Federal Unemployment Tax Act (“FUTA”) 
The FUTA132 serves as a social insurance to fund unemployment costs 
in the United States.133  It is imposed on employers at a rate of 6% on the first 
$7000 of each employee’s earnings.134  The FUTA provides unemployment 
benefits to workers who lose jobs due to no fault of their own.135  By provid-
ing replacement wages to unemployed workers, the FUTA tax has signifi-
cantly influenced economic stability in the United States.136  At the close of 
                                                          
 128.  See Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, § 102(a), 79 Stat. 286, 291 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§1395-1395kkk-1 (2012)); Social Security Amendments of 
1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, § 121(a), 79 Stat. 286, 343 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§1396-
1396w-5 (2012)) (Medicaid); see also Juliette Cubanski et al., A Primer on Medicare: Key Facts 
About the Medicare Program and the People It Covers, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Mar. 20, 2015), 
https://www.kff.org/report-section/a-primer-on-medicare-how-is-medicare-financed-and-what-
are-medicares-future-financing-challenges/; Research, Statistics & Policy Analysis, supra note 123 
(documenting the 2020 Medicare tax rate of 1.45%); Treu, supra note 124, at 597–98 (describing 
the inception of Medicare). 
 129.  Juliette Cubanski et al., The Facts on Medicare Spending and Financing, KAISER FAM. 
FOUND. (Aug. 20, 2019), https://www.kff.org/medicare/issue-brief/the-facts-on-medicare-spend-
ing-and-financing/.  
 130.  See Anderson, supra note 121. 
 131.  See Treu, supra note 124, at 598 (further documenting that Medicare benefits apply to 
persons “who are sixty-five years or older and who worked for at least forty quarters, or ten years, 
in Medicare-covered employment”); see also Michael J. DeBoer, Medicare Coverage Policy and 
Decision Making, Preventive Services, and Comparative Effectiveness Research Before and After 
the Affordable Care Act, 7 J. HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL L. 493, 501 (2012) (discussing Medicare 
eligibility, which includes individuals sixty-five and over, spouses, individuals under sixty-five 
years of age with certain disabilities, and those with end-stage renal disease). 
 132.  I.R.C. §§ 3301–11 (2012). 
 133.  See Harrington, supra note 127, at 62 (discussing FUTA’s purpose).  
 134.  See id.; see also I.R.C. § 3301; Robyn L. Robinson, A Discussion of the Application of 
FICA and FUTA to Indian Tribes’ On-Reservation Activities, 25 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 37, 40 (2000-
2001) (providing an explanation of the Federal Unemployment Tax Act). 
 135.  See Charles P. Sabatino & Simi Litvak, Liability Issues Affecting Consumer-Directed Per-
sonal Assistance Services—Report and Recommendations, 4 ELDER L.J. 247, 270 (1996). 
 136.  See Price, supra note 115, at 30. 
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2017, 1.87 million people were receiving unemployment insurance bene-
fits.137 
B.  The Effect of U.S. Employment Tax Policy 
Revenue generated by the payroll tax is vital to the promotion of U.S. 
economic stability.  Only the individual income tax collects more federal rev-
enue.138  The payroll tax base is particularly broad, and the supply of workers 
since its inception has helped maintain revenue production;139 however, the 
tax significantly burdens low and middle income taxpayers as compared to 
higher income workers.140 
Scholars and policy advocates have raised concerns about employment 
tax disparity.141  Using the measure of effective tax rate, the payroll tax is 
substantially more burdensome on wage earners as compared to wealthy in-
vestors.142  For numerous working class taxpayers, the employment tax is a 
larger financial burden than that of the income tax.143  Only within house-
holds where incomes reach the six figure mark does the income tax owed 
                                                          
 137.  Joseph Lawler, Number of Workers Receiving Unemployment Benefits Falls to Lowest 
Level in 44 Years, WASH. EXAMINER (Jan. 11, 2018, 8:36 AM), https://www.washingtonex-
aminer.com/number-of-workers-receiving-unemployment-benefits-falls-to-lowest-level-in-44-
years.  
 138.  See Federal Payroll Taxes, CTR. BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES (Apr. 17, 2020), 
https://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/10-17-12tax.pdf (noting that in 2019, 35.9% of 
federal revenue was generated from the payroll tax); see also Linda Sugin, Payroll Taxes, Mythol-
ogy, and Fairness, 51 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 113, 118 (2014) (noting role that payroll tax plays in the 
United States). 
 139.  See John Olson, Payroll Taxes: The Good, the Bad, and the Solutions, TAX FOUND. (Aug. 
2, 2016), https://taxfoundation.org/payroll-taxes-good-bad-and-solutions/ (implying that tax eva-
sion of payroll taxes is difficult due to the requisite withholding requirements at the employer level). 
 140.  See Dexter, supra note 17, at 371; see also Policy Basics: Top Ten Facts About Social 
Security, supra note 12.   
 141.  See Sugin, supra note 138, at 119 (stating it is difficult to argue the fairness of the payroll 
tax); see also Deborah A. Geier, Integrating the Tax Burdens of the Federal Income and Payroll 
Taxes on Labor Income, 22 VA. TAX REV. 1, 6 (2002) (questioning whether the distribution of the 
tax burden with regard to Social Security and Medicare rates and wage bases is “fair”); Michael J. 
Graetz, The Troubled Marriage of Retirement Security and Tax Policies, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 851, 
852 (1987) (arguing that there is unfairness in the social security tax and payments scheme); Dan 
Seltzer, Attacks on a Tax: An Alternative to the Earned Income Tax Credit to Remedy the Unfairness 
in the Payroll Tax System, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 187, 187 (2003) (stating that the payroll tax “fall[s] 
disproportionately on the poor and middle-class”); Templin, supra note 120, at 28 (discussing the 
disparities in wage growth between workers and the fairness of the regressive payroll tax). 
 142.  See Sugin, supra note 138, at 113 (noting that the payroll tax is only imposed on wages, 
thus reducing or eliminating the tax burden on the wealthy who earn money via investment oppor-
tunities); see also Geier, supra note 141, at 3 (stating that the payroll tax “results in a “higher portion 
of the federal tax burden being borne by labor income (as opposed to capital income, which is con-
centrated in the wealthier households)”). 
 143.  See Howard Gleckman, For Most Households, It’s About the Payroll Tax, Not the Income 
Tax, TAX POL’Y CTR. (Apr. 2, 2015), http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxvox/most-households-its-
about-payroll-tax-not-income-tax (noting that a 2015 report by the Joint Committee on Taxation 
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exceed that of the payroll tax.144  Additionally, although the tax is shared 
between employers and employees, employers can eliminate their portion by 
crafting downward adjustments in salaries and wages.145 
Despite claims of unfairness, politicians have been reluctant to enter into 
this discussion, instead preferring to focus debate on the income tax.146  Alt-
hough the income tax is the largest revenue source for the federal govern-
ment, politicians’ hesitancy to address the employment tax is troubling con-
sidering that, in 2016, 44% of households paid zero dollars in federal income 
tax while 60% were subject to the FICA tax.147   
The payroll tax underpinning requires that the federal government col-
lect revenue from present-day workers to fund current beneficiaries.148  Alt-
hough more than 60 million people rely on benefits generated by the employ-
ment tax, the long-term sustainability of the Social Security program could 
be jeopardized due to two demographic swings—the continuous retirement 
of baby boomers and the increasing life expectancies of Americans.149  U.S. 
Census data supports that 10,000 of the total estimated 73 million baby 
boomers turn age sixty-five every day, and the entire baby boomer population 
will be sixty-five or older by 2030.150  In addition, the average life expectancy 
in 1935 was 61.9 years; since then, life expectancy in the United States has 
                                                          
found that 80 million low-earning taxpayers pay no federal income tax but pay $121 billion in pay-
roll taxes, while middle-income families pay three times as much in payroll taxes as federal income 
tax); see also Geier, supra note 141, at 18 (documenting that payroll taxes are not creditable against 
the income tax due nor deductible by employees under the income tax). 
 144.  See id.; see also Sugin, supra note 138, at 119 (acknowledging that “[t]he income tax ex-
ceeds the payroll tax only for the top quintile of taxpayers”).  
 145.  See Sugin, supra note 138, at 119. 
 146.  See Geier, supra note 141, at 3 (noting that few politicians speak about the payroll tax, 
instead allowing debates to center on the federal income tax burden). 
 147.  See Roberton C. Williams, Most Americans Pay More Payroll Tax than Income Tax, TAX 
POL’Y CTR.: TAXVOX (Sept. 6, 2016), https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxvox/most-americans-
pay-more-payroll-tax-income-tax.  
 148.  See Dexter, supra note 17, at 351. 
 149.  See Sean Williams, Republican Efforts to Reform Social Security Could Financially Crip-
ple Most Seniors, MOTLEY FOOL (Jan. 1, 2017, 6:02 AM), https://www.fool.com/retire-
ment/2017/01/01/republican-efforts-to-reform-social-security-could.aspx. 
 150.  America Counts Staff, 2020 Census Will Help Policymakers Prepare for the Incoming 
Wave of Aging Boomers, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Dec. 10, 2019), https://www.census.gov/li-
brary/stories/2019/12/by-2030-all-baby-boomers-will-be-age-65-or-older.html. 
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increased to 78.86 years.151  This surge has resulted in qualifying persons 
receiving benefits for lengthier periods of time.152 
These statistics raise important questions about whether employment 
tax revenue is sufficient to sustain Social Security and Medicare benefits in 
the future.153  It is estimated that 88.4 million beneficiaries will be entitled to 
receive $1.672 trillion in benefits by 2035.154  The Social Security Act reports 
that there are currently 2.8 workers per Social Security beneficiary; however, 
this number is expected to drop to 2.3 workers per beneficiary by 2035.155  
This future projection does not take into account recent research estimates 
regarding the impact of automation substitution in the workforce. 
Social Security and Medicare continue to be instrumental in realizing 
social policy goals by providing necessary insurance and healthcare to stabi-
lize the U.S. economy.  In addition, the FUTA tax revenue provides essential 
benefits to unemployed workers.  Automation substitution, however, is 
threatening the continued viability of these programs.  Employment tax pol-
icy goals cannot be realized if they are undermined by the promotion of in-
novation.  U.S. innovation tax policy, which evolved from more generalized 
innovation policy, supports invention stimulation.156  Although tax incentives 
can improve social welfare by motivating research and development, the pub-
lic benefit must be more than consumers’ use of invention.  As discussed in 
the following Part, evolving innovation policy has shifted away from social 
welfare goals towards increased economic advancement, resulting in a dis-
harmony with U.S. employment tax policy. 
                                                          
 151.  See Life Expectancy in the USA, 1900–98, BERKELEY DEMOGRAPHY, http://www.de-
mog.berkeley.edu/~andrew/1918/figure2.html (last visited Jan. 11, 2018); see also Life Expectancy 
All Races, WORLDLIFEEXPECTANCY.COM, http://www.worldlifeexpectancy.com/usa/life-expec-
tancy (last visited Jan. 11, 2019). 
 152.  See Adi Libson, Confronting the Retirement Savings Problem: Redesigning the Saver’s 
Credit, 54 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 207, 216 (2017) (noting that increased life expectancy and reduced 
mortality rates impact Social Security solvency). 
 153.  See Templin, supra note 120, at 1–3 (generally assessing policy options of increasing the 
retirement age); see also Jagadeesh Gokhale, Social Security Reform: Does Privatization Still Make 
Sense?, 50 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 169, 169 (2013) (discussing the privatization of Social Security as 
the program heads for insolvency due to the onslaught of baby boomer retirements); Martha Hol-
stein & Kristen Pavle, The “Crisis” in Retirement Security: Social Security Is the Answer, Not the 
Problem, 46 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 719, 719 (2013) (addressing the threats to retirement security); 
Peter H. Schuck, The Golden Age of Aging, and Its Discontents, 18 ELDER L.J. 25, 27 (2010) (noting 
the approaching insolvency of Social Security and Medicare); Alexander G. Karl, Note, Uncle Sam 
Killed Grandma: How the Estate Tax Can Help Alleviate Medicare Uncertainty, 25 ELDER L.J. 443, 
445 (2018) (proposing the sustainability of Medicare funding through the federal Estate Tax). 
 154.  Henry Aaron, How to Keep Social Security Secure, AM. PROSPECT (May 1, 2018), 
http://prospect.org/article/how-keep-social-security-secure (designating that benefit amount in 2017 
dollars). 
 155.  See Fact Sheet, SOC. SECURITY ADMIN., https://www.ssa.gov/news/press/fact-
sheets/basicfact-alt.pdf (last visited Jan. 11, 2019). 
 156.  See infra text accompanying notes 170–179.  
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III.  INNOVATION TAX POLICY AND INDUSTRIALIZATION 
While U.S. employment tax policy originated with adoption of the 
OASDI, innovation tax policy—dedicated to unlocking innovation poten-
tial—evolved incrementally from the time of the founding fathers.157  Intel-
lectual property protection dates back to the United States Constitution, 
which gives Congress the power “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and 
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the ex-
clusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”158  Mindful of 
the importance of innovation, the founding fathers sought to preserve inven-
tors’ ability to reap the economic fruits of their labors by ensuring ownership 
rights to their creations.159  
In 1813, Thomas Jefferson noted that intellectual property rights not 
only afford profits to those pursuing innovation but also benefit society.160  
The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly acknowledged Jefferson’s 
perspective and recognized both social and economic benefits of intellectual 
property.161  Similarly, scholars also note innovation policy’s twin goals of 
economic progress and knowledge spillover.162   
                                                          
 157.  See Jeffrey Owens, Taxes for Innovation, OECD OBSERVER, http://oecdob-
server.org/news/fullstory.php/aid/3271/Taxes_for_innovation.html (last visited Jan. 11, 2019) (dis-
cussing how taxes can spur innovation). 
 158.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 159.  See THE FEDERALIST No. 43 (James Madison) (“The right to useful inventions seems with 
equal reason to belong to the inventors.”); see also Jennifer L. Case, How the America Invents Act 
Hurts American Inventors and Weakens Incentives to Innovate, 82 UMKC L. REV. 29, 51, 62 
(2013). 
 160.  Loletta Darden, Lights, Lights, Lights! Finding Light in the Darkness of The Public/ Private 
Patent Debate, 9 AM. U. INTELL. PROP. BRIEF 106, 143 (2018) (citing Letter from Thomas Jefferson 
to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813), in 13 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 326, 335 (An-
drew A. Lipscomb & Albert Ellery Bergh eds., 1903)). 
 161.  See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1966) (stating that Jefferson “clearly 
recognized the social and economic rationale of the patent system”); see also Mazer v. Stein, 347 
U.S. 201, 219 (1954) (“The economic philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to grant 
patents and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is 
the best way to advance public welfare through the talents of authors and inventors in ‘Science and 
useful Arts.’”). 
 162.  See, e.g., Harry First, Controlling the Intellectual Property Grab: Protect Innovation, Not 
Innovators, 38 RUTGERS L. J. 365, 374 (2007) (clarifying that the economic philosophy behind 
innovation entails both personal gain and public welfare advancement); Thomas L. Hayslett III, 
1995 Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property: Harmonizing the Commercial 
Use of Legal Monopolies with the Prohibitions of Antitrust Law, 3 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 375, 378–79 
(1996) (noting that intellectual property law maximizes consumer welfare by promoting investment 
in innovation while also extending to inventors “the carrot of supracompetitive profits”); Maayan 
Perel, An Ex Ante Theory of Patent Valuation: Transforming Patent Quality into Patent Value, 14 
J. HIGH TECH L. 148, 200 (2014) (evaluating that patents incentivize innovation under the economic 
basis, and that incentivizing innovation results in increased public welfare); Arti Kaur Rai, Regu-
lating Scientific Research: Intellectual Property Rights and the Norms of Science, 94 NW. U. L. 
REV. 77, 116 (1999) (discussing that the traditional economic justification for granting patent rights 
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Although both economic progress and social welfare have long been 
noted as the underpinning of U.S. innovation policy, the United States has 
allowed the pursuit of economic progress to eclipse the importance of social 
benefits in innovation tax policy.  To support such conclusion, this Part dis-
cusses U.S. innovation policy and economic and social benefits.  This Part 
also demonstrates how innovation tax policy evolved from a broader innova-
tion policy and provides evidence that innovation tax policy has shifted its 
focus from social welfare towards economic progress. 
A.  U.S. Innovation Policy 
U.S. policy expressly seeks to advance innovation.163  Indeed, the 
United States employs an arsenal of tools to ensure that its citizens reap the 
benefits of continued technological advancement.164  As previously noted, 
the United States Constitution and other federal law165 provides limited time 
                                                          
is to incentivize persons to create for the public good); Mark A. Lemley, Romantic Authorship and 
the Rhetoric of Property, 75 TEX. L. REV. 873, 902–03 (1997) (reviewing JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS, 
SOFTWARE, AND SPLEENS: LAW AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE INFORMATION SOCIETY (1996)) 
(elevating the public interest goal by characterizing intellectual property rights as “a necessary 
evil—a restriction on the free flow of information to the minimum extent necessary to encourage 
needed investment in innovation.”). 
 163.  See James Goh, Primer: Innovation Policy in the United States, UNIV. OF PA. PUB. POL’Y 
INITIATIVE (Apr. 28, 2017), https://publicpolicy.wharton.upenn.edu/live/news/1840-primer-inno-
vation-policy-in-the-united-states (analyzing the effects of U.S. innovation policy and noting that 
“the United States has implemented a slew of innovation policies”). 
 164.  See Michael J. Graetz & Rachael Doud, Technological Innovation, International Compe-
tition, and the Challenges of International Income Taxation, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 347, 350 (2013); 
see also infra notes 165–172 and accompanying text.  
 165.  Following the adoption of Article 1, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution, the Patent Act of 
1790 was established, followed by the revised Patent Act of 1793.  Almost half a century later a 
major revision resulted in the 1836 Patent Act, designating the U.S. Patent Office as an executive 
agency, and in 1890 Congress passed the Sherman Act to address improper business monopoliza-
tions.  Modern reform to the U.S. patent system came with the enactment of the Patent Act of 1952.  
Since then, case law has served as the prominent outlet for the continued evolution of U.S. patent 
law, with the 2011 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (“AIA”) representing the most significant 
legislative change to the U.S. patent system since 1952.  See Patent Act of 1790, Ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109; 
Patent Act of 1793, Ch. 11, 1 Stat. 318; Patent Act of 1836, Ch. 357, 5 Stat. 117; Sherman Antitrust 
Act of 1890, Ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209; Patent Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-593, 66 Stat. 792; Leahy-
Smith America Invents Act (AIA), Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011); see also Diane Lu, 
Note, In the Face of Strong Patent Rights: Using The Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act to 
Combat Patent Abuse in International Commerce, 21 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 136, 146–48 (2015) 
(documenting the adoption of the Sherman Act to combat anticompetitive behavior relating to U.S. 
patents); A Brief History of The Patent Law of the United States, LADAS & PARRY (May 7, 2014), 
https://ladas.com/education-center/a-brief-history-of-the-patent-law-of-the-united-states-2/ (dis-
cussing the major and minor changes to patent law included in the 1952 revision); see also Alice 
Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 212 (2014) (holding that claims directed to abstract ideas 
require additional elements capable of rendering them significantly more than the abstract ideas 
themselves); KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 415 (2007) (providing that certain con-
siderations must be given to determine the obviousness of a patent claim); Diamond v. Diehr, 450 
U.S. 175, 184 (1981) (determining that controlling the execution of a physical process by running a 
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legal monopolies in the form of copyrights and patents (among others).166  
The federal government also uses prizes and grants to incentivize innova-
tion.167  More than two dozen federal agencies and departments directly fund 
research and development (“R&D”) activities.168  In fiscal year 2016, this 
funding topped $142 billion.169  In addition to direct expenditures, the United 
States also makes extensive use of tax expenditures to promote innovation.170  
Tax expenditures are tax code provisions that preference certain activities or 
taxpayers.171  Tax expenditures may take the form of exclusions, deductions, 
deferrals, credits, or tax rates.172  Innovation preferences enjoy wide political 
and public support, and tax incentives for innovation have been particularly 
popular.173   
1.  Innovation Policy Goal: Economic Progress 
Innovation policy is strongly linked, both economically and politically, 
to prosperity.174 The United States, as well as other nations, view innovation-
                                                          
computer does not preclude the patentability of the invention in its entirety); Diamond v. 
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 304 (1980) (holding that “a live, human-made micro-organism is pa-
tentable”); Aro Manufacturing Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336, 345–46 
(1961) (redefining the U.S. patent law doctrine of repair and reconstruction); Phillips v. AWH 
Corp., 415 F. 3d 1303, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (clarifying the hierarchy of evidentiary sources that 
can be used for claim construction in patent law). 
 166.  United States law also recognizes trademark rights.  State laws recognize trade secret pro-
tection.  
 167.  See Daniel J. Hemel & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Beyond the Patents-Prizes Debate, 92 
TEX. L. REV. 303, 316 (2013) (noting the use of “prizes, patents, grants, and tax credits to incentivize 
the invention and commercialization of new technologies”“); Graetz & Doud, supra note 164, at 
350 (stating that the law provides “legal protections for IP; government grants, loans, and loan guar-
antees to both for-profit firms and not-for-profit research institutions; and tax benefits for both R&D 
itself and the gains from innovation”). 
 168.  NAT’L SCI. FOUND., SCIENCE & ENGINEERING INDICATORS 2018, at 8-74 to 8-76 (2018), 
https://nsf.gov/statistics/2018/nsb20181/report/sections/invention-knowledge-transfer-and-innova-
tion/innovation-indicators-united-states-and-other-major-economies#government-policies-and-
programs-to-reduce-barriers-to-innovation (showing federal R&D expenditure by agency in fiscal 
years 2011 to 2016).  
 169.  Id. at 8-75. 
 170.  See Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 167. 
 171.  Briefing Book, TAX POL’Y CTR., https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/briefing-book/what-are-
tax-expenditures-and-how-are-they-structured (last visited Jan. 11, 2019). 
 172.  Id. 
 173.  See Graetz & Doud, supra note 164, at 350 (noting support as “ubiquitous”); see also Dan 
L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575, 1580 (2003); Ste-
phen E. Shay et al., R&D Tax Incentives: Growth Panacea or Budget Trojan Horse?, 69 TAX L. 
REV. 419, 419–20 (2016) (remarking that supporting R&D tax incentives “is the tax equivalent of 
embracing motherhood and apple pie”). 
 174.  See Graetz & Doud, supra note 164, at 388 (noting impact of technological innovation on 
national wealth and discussing the spillover effects of research and development). 
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based productivity increases as an economic catalyst and critical to improv-
ing national and global standards of living.175  The general public believes, 
and many scholars concur, that the competitiveness of the national economy 
hinges on technological advancement176: “Achieving preeminence in high 
technology is widely viewed as a critical element of the economic competi-
tiveness . . . .”177  These beliefs are well-founded.  Research has substantiated 
the link between innovation and productivity,178 and pro-innovation federal 
policy has been correlated with increased U.S. manufacturing productivity.179  
U.S. policymakers have asserted both implicitly and explicitly that they 
assume innovation increases long-term productivity.180  Pursuit of increased 
productivity through technology takes the form of a public-private partner-
ship in the United States.  Although businesses own most of today’s valuable 
                                                          
 175.  See id. at 351 (noting the benefits of R&D, including substantial “geographic spillovers” 
and stating, “National governments also want the resulting IP to be governed by their laws, their 
citizens to be the principal beneficiaries of the economic growth resulting from technological inno-
vations, their resident MNEs to own the resulting technology, and the tax revenues from such inno-
vations to flow into their own treasury”). 
 176.  See Ufuk Akcigit et al., When America Was Most Innovative, and Why, HARV. BUS. REV. 
(Mar. 6, 2017), https://hbr.org/2017/03/when-america-was-most-innovative-and-why; see also 
Ufuk Akcigit & Stefanie Stantcheva, Taxation and Innovation, NAT’L BUREAU ECON. RES. REP., 
Sept. 2018, at 14.(noting the relationship between innovation, technological progress, and economic 
growth); Darrell M. West, Technology and the Innovation Economy, CTR. FOR TECH. INNOVATION 
AT BROOKINGS (Oct. 19, 2011), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/up-
loads/2016/06/1019_technology_innovation_west.pdf (noting results of 2009 survey showing over-
whelming belief in innovation’s importance to economy).  
 177.  Linda A. Mabry, Multinational Corporations and U.S. Technology Policy: Rethinking the 
Concept of Corporate Nationality, 87 GEO. L.J. 563, 567 (1999). 
 178.  See Åsa Hansson & Cécile Brokelind, Tax Incentives, Tax Expenditures Theories in R&D: 
The Case of Sweden, 6 WORLD TAX J. 168, 176 (2014) (“[S]tudies based on European data have 
found that R&D activities improve productivity and stimulate economic growth.”). 
 179.  See Graetz & Doud, supra note 164, at 388 (“Productivity has increased, reducing the 
number of employees required to produce similar output.  The average American factory worker 
now produces $180,000 worth of goods a year, which is more than three times what he would have 
produced in 1978 in today’s dollars.  Further, while the number of U.S. manufacturing jobs has 
decreased from twenty million in 1979 to twelve million today, value added in U.S. manufacturing 
increased by more than two-thirds during that period.” (citing ENRICO MORETTI, THE NEW 
GEOGRAPHY OF JOBS 10–17 (2012))); see also Hansson & Brokelind, supra note 178, at 175 (noting 
increasing productivity and spillover effects to other businesses and industries). 
 180.  See Preface to CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, FEDERAL SUPPORT FOR RESEARCH AND 
DEVELOPMENT VII–XII, 1 (2007), https://www.cbo.gov/sites/de-
fault/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/82xx/doc8221/06-18-research.pdf (noting direct and indirect subsidies 
for innovation in that “lawmakers have provided about $137 billion in budget authority to support 
federal research and development (R&D) activities” and that “tax preferences are in place to en-
courage the private sector to increase its R&D spending”).  This report also notes productivity gains 
of innovation.  Id.; see also CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, R&D AND PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH 2 (2005) 
(presenting the theoretical premise and evidence for a link between research and development 
spending and productivity growth); Lital Helman, Curated Innovation, 49 AKRON L. REV. 695, 701 
(2016) (finding governmental innovation incentive instruments, including grants or prizes). 
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intellectual property,181 the federal government endeavors to create opportu-
nities for collaboration among industry, academia, and the government to 
stimulate creativity and innovation.182  However, U.S. innovation policy re-
quires that economic progress be balanced against the twin goal of preserving 
public knowledge and welfare. 
2.  Innovation Policy Goal: Advancing Public Knowledge and 
Welfare 
In addition to economic progress, a primary objective of U.S. innovation 
policy is to enhance social welfare with knowledge spillover.183  Thomas Jef-
ferson characterized intellectual property as a public good, declaring that 
“ideas should freely spread from one to another over the globe, for the moral 
and mutual instruction of man.”184 
This perspective continues to find support centuries later.  The United 
States Supreme Court has expressly noted public benefit as the foundational 
principle for intellectual property rights.185  Three times during the mid-twen-
tieth century the Court cited public knowledge and interest as primary moti-
vations for intellectual property rights.  In 1948, the Court identified the “ben-
efits derived by the public from the labors of authors” as the primary purpose 
of intellectual property rights.186  Less than ten years later, the Court noted 
that “[t]he economic philosophy behind the [intellectual property] clause . . . 
is the conviction that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is 
the best way to advance public welfare.”187  Later, in 1966, the Court cited to 
                                                          
 181.  See Stephanie Plamondon Bair, Innovation Inc., 32 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 713, 716 (2017) 
(citing Jeanne C. Fromer, Expressive Incentives in Intellectual Property, 98 VA. L. REV. 1745, 
1779–81 (2012)). 
 182.  See Rishi Iyengar, These Three Countries Are Winning the Global Robot Race, CNN BUS. 
(Aug. 21, 2017, 10:14 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2017/08/21/technology/future/artificial-intelli-
gence-robots-india-china-us/index.html; see also Stanley “Skip” Pruss, The Case for Clean Energy 
Technology Manufacturing: Ten Steps Business and Industry Must Take to Optimize Opportunities 
in the Emerging Clean Energy Economy, 18 MICH. TELECOMM. TECH. L. REV. 349, 360 (2011) 
(noting the collaborative efforts the United States has taken to remain a leader in global innovation). 
 183.  See Ramsey Hanna, Misusing Antitrust: The Search for Functional Copyright Misuse 
Standards, 46 STAN. L. REV. 401, 420 (1994). 
 184.  See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 9 n.2 (1966) (quoting VI WRITINGS OF THOMAS 
JEFFERSON 180–81 (H. A. Washington ed. 1861)). 
 185.  See Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 524 (1994) (“The primary objective of the 
Copyright Act is to encourage the production of original literary, artistic, and musical expression 
for the good of the public.”); Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349–50 (1991) 
(stating that the public interest is the “primary objective of copyright”); Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 
207, 228 (1990) (stating that copyright balances “the artist’s right to control [his or her] work” with 
“the public’s need for access”). 
 186.  United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948). 
 187.  Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954). 
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Jefferson to support the proposition that “[t]he patent monopoly was not de-
signed to secure to the inventor his natural right in his discoveries.  Rather, it 
was a reward, an inducement, to bring forth new knowledge.”188 
One scholar so elevates the public interest in innovation that he charac-
terizes intellectual property rights as “a necessary evil—a restriction on the 
free flow of information to the minimum extent necessary to encourage 
needed investment in innovation.”189  Indeed, some argue that intellectual 
property rights for innovation are warranted because innovation provides “a 
net benefit to society” in that the promotion of innovation swaps “the disutil-
ity of restricted output and higher prices for the greater social utility . . . that 
might otherwise not be produced.”190  
The concern that firms underinvest in innovation is often used to justify 
governmental efforts to incentivize innovation, whether through intellectual 
property rights, grants, or tax expenditures.  Economic theory suggests that 
innovation suffers from market failure because discoveries and inventions are 
often nonexcludable, meaning that—without the help of interventions like 
intellectual property rights—a creator often cannot prevent others from using 
his or her invention.191  Nonexcludable goods like discoveries are “expensive 
to produce but easy to appropriate.”192  Innovation is also often nonrivalrous, 
meaning that the knowledge manifested in a discovery or invention can be 
used repeatedly for no additional cost.193  Innovation’s nature as nonrivalrous 
and nonexcludable makes it a public good.194  Consequently, firms cannot 
solely capture the benefits of innovation—they share at least some of the 
benefits with the public.  For these reasons, among others, economic theory 
                                                          
 188.  Graham, 383 U.S. at 9. 
 189.  Lemley, supra note 162, at 902–03. 
 190.  Burk & Lemley, supra note 173, at 1580; see also ROBERT P. MERGES, JUSTIFYING 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 2 (2011) (noting IP law as seeking “to maximize the net social benefit 
of the practices it regulates”); Jacob Nussim & Anat Sorek, Theorizing Tax Incentives for Innova-
tion, 36 VA. TAX REV. 25, 31 (2017) (opining that “[m]arket failures represent situations in which 
free competitive markets do not necessarily accomplish first best optimal outcomes, and therefore, 
government intervention may be warranted in order to fix the failures—and in our case, to induce 
further innovation”); Shay et al., supra note 173, at 419–20.  
 191.  See Burk & Lemley, supra note 173, at 1580. 
 192.  Id. 
 193.  See Nussim & Sorek, supra note 190, at 31 (discussing the market failures and nonrivalrous 
nature of information and its production). 
 194.  See id.; see also Burk & Lemley, supra note 173, at 1580. 
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suggests that firms are under-incentivized to invest in innovation195 and must 
be offered an incentive to engage in a desirable level of innovation.196  
Economic theory also suggests that “innovation responds to incentives,” 
and firms are enticed by the hanging carrot of financial gain to engage in 
more desirable levels of innovation.197  Some scholars argue that induce-
ments like tax incentives are necessary to drive the U.S. economy forward 
while also benefitting the social welfare.198  The need for incentives to further 
promote R&D brought about the birth of innovation tax policy in the United 
States. 
B.  Tax in U.S. Innovation Policy 
Although the Constitution and early patent laws secured intellectual 
property rights at the nation’s inception, innovation and intellectual property 
received no special treatment for income tax purposes.199  Innovation tax pol-
icy did not begin taking shape until the 1954 U.S. Tax Code (the “Code”) 
                                                          
 195.  See Burk & Lemley, supra note 173, at 1580; Hansson & Brokelind, supra note 178, at 
175 (stating that knowledge is “a public good and “for efficiency reasons, should be distributed to 
others to use at no cost” because of the inability to exclude others); see also Shay et al., supra note 
173, at 419–20. 
 196.  MERGES, supra note 190, at 2 (“Society offers above-market rewards to creators of certain 
works that would not be created, or not created as soon or as well, in the absence of reward.”).  The 
concept of innovation being nonrivalrous and nonexcludable promotes the public good, but without 
additional gratification has historically resulted in firms being under-incentivized to invest in inno-
vation.  See Burk & Lemley, supra note 173, at 1580 (providing that the patent system promotes 
innovation through exclusive rights); Hansson & Brokelind, supra note 178, at 175 (discussing the 
nature of knowledge production); Shay et al., supra note 173, at 419–20 (noting that the United 
States advances R&D through expenditures and tax policies). 
 197.  Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Patent Experimentalism, 101 VA. L. REV. 65, 75 (2015); see also 
MERGES, supra note 190, at 2 (discussing the economic incentives necessary for the production of 
intellectual property). 
 198.  See Burk & Lemley, supra note 173, at 1580 (noting the purpose of a “net benefit to soci-
ety” when discussing government inducements for innovation); see also MERGES, supra note 190, 
at 2 (noting the goal of social benefit in intellectual property law); Nussim & Sorek, supra note 190, 
at 31 (discussing the government action to remedy innovation market failure); Shay et al., supra 
note 173, at 419–20. 
 199.  See Xuan-Thao Nguyen & Jeffrey A. Maine, The History of Intellectual Property Taxation: 
Promoting Innovation and Other Intellectual Property Goals?, 64 SMU L. REV. 795, 811–13 (2011) 
(providing a comprehensive history of the taxation of intellectual property law noting that 
“[a]lthough it was well-established that intellectual property was property, many early tax cases 
struggled to identify when intangible intellectual property rights constituted separable property for 
tax purposes”). 
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revision.200  Prior to this mid-twentieth-century revision, the courts, taxpay-
ers, and the Internal Revenue Service applied tangible property tax laws to 
intangible know-how and creations.201 
In 1954, Congress adopted two provisions to govern intellectual prop-
erty taxation.  Congress enacted the first of these, Internal Revenue Code 
section 174, to incentivize investment in R&D.202  This section, which was 
recently amended in 2017,203 allows taxpayers to “treat research or experi-
mental expenditures . . . as expenses which are not chargeable to capital ac-
count.”204  It allows taxpayers to immediately deduct from their gross income 
R&D expenses connected to their businesses, reducing the tax basis.205  With-
out section 174, these expenses would otherwise be capitalized and could not 
be recouped without a realization event—at an unknown time in the future. 
In simple terms, investors can elect to bundle and deduct their qualifying 
R&D expenses when initially incurred, thus reducing their tax liability in the 
early years of research.206  For example, if ABC Corp. spends $500,000 in 
qualifying R&D expenditures in year 2021, it can elect to immediately reduce 
its net income by $500,000 that same year.  This provision is elective, how-
ever, and taxpayers may instead choose to capitalize their R&D expenses 
over no less than a sixty-month period in which they first realize benefits 
from their expenditures.207 
The second provision that Congress added during the 1954 Code revi-
sion was Internal Revenue Code section 1235.208  This section allows patent 
owners to qualify for lower, long-term capital gain tax rates when selling 
                                                          
 200.  Id. at 831.   
 201.  Professors Nguyen and Maine provide a comprehensive compilation of the long and wind-
ing road of jurisprudence courts used in using tangible property rules to determine the tax treatment 
of intangible property during this period.  See Nguyen & Maine, supra note 199. 
 202.  See I.R.C. § 174(a) (2012). 
 203.  In 2017, Internal Revenue Code section 174 was amended to ostensibly require taxpayers 
to capitalize R&D expenditures beginning December 31, 2021.  See I.R.C. § 174(a)(2).  However, 
the amendment permits R&D expenditures conducted in the United States to be amortized over a 
five-year period.  See I.R.C. § 174(a)(2)(B).  While this change appears, on its face, to force capi-
talization of R&D expenses and remove the expensing benefits of section 174, a closer reading 
shows that the change is only a five-year amortization.  Consequently, firms are unlikely to have to 
capitalize R&D expenses; the recovery is merely lengthened to five years, which is significantly 
more beneficial than capitalization. 
 204.  I.R.C. § 174(a)(1). 
 205.  See id.; see also Xuan-Thao Nguyen & Jeffrey A. Maine, Acquiring Innovation, 57 AM. 
U. L. REV. 775, 793 (2008) (discussing the origin and function of section 174); see also William A. 
Drennan, Changing Invention Economics by Encouraging Corporate Inventors to Sell Patents, 58 
U. MIAMI L. REV. 1045, 1059 (2004) (explaining the tax benefit accompanying section 174(a)(1)). 
 206.  See Drennan, supra note 205, at 1135. 
 207.  See I.R.C. § 174(b)(1). 
 208.  See I.R.C. § 1235; see also Nguyen & Maine, supra note 205, at 794–95 (discussing the 
origin and function of section 1235).  
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their intellectual property rights.209  Without section 1235, proceeds from the 
sale of a patent would be taxed at the generally higher ordinary income tax 
rates.210 
In the decades following the adoption of these two provisions, Congress 
made minimal changes to U.S. innovation tax policy.211  The onset of the 
third industrial revolution, however, refueled Congress’s interest in stimulat-
ing innovation.  Unlike the Supreme Court opinions of the mid-century that 
extolled public benefits as being primary motivations for intellectual property 
rights, Congress shifted its attention toward achieving economic progress 
with the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 (“ERTA”).212  ERTA was de-
signed to “ensure economic growth in the years ahead” and “stimulate 
productivity and innovation throughout the economy.”213 
In the ERTA, Congress adopted Internal Revenue Code section 41, a 
research credit to be used in combination with the section 174 deduction to 
stimulate research activity.214  Section 41, adopted as a temporary provision, 
was extended sixteen times and ultimately made permanent in 2015.215  
Known as the Research and Experimentation (“R&E”) tax credit, section 41 
rewards U.S. businesses that intensify their investment efforts in R&D.216  
This provision provides firms a dollar-for-dollar reduction in tax liability for 
up to 20% of their qualified research expenses over a historical base 
amount.217  A decade later, Congress implemented Internal Revenue Code 
                                                          
 209.  See I.R.C. § 1235(a); see also Drennan, supra note 205, at 1139–40. 
 210.  See Drennan, supra note 205, at 1139.  
 211.  See Nguyen & Maine, supra note 199, at 831 (noting the ad hoc changes to innovation tax 
policy); see e.g., I.R.C. § 177 (1982) (repealed 1986) (amended in 1956 regarding small business 
issues with trademarks); I.R.C. § 170(e) (amended in 1969 regarding charitable deduction abuse by 
copyright owners); I.R.C. § 1253 (amended in 1969 regarding trademark transfers).  
 212.  See Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 101, 95 Stat. 172, 176–85. 
 213.  See JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, JCS-71-81, GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE ECONOMIC 
RECOVERY TAX ACT OF 1981 17 (1981). 
 214.  See Nina J. Crimm, A Tax Proposal to Promote Pharmacologic Research, to Encourage 
Conventional Prescription Drug Innovation and Improvement, and to Reduce Product Liability 
Claims, 29 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1007, 1057–58 (1994); see also Tax Treatment Legislative His-
tory, R&D COALITION, https://investinamericasfuture.org/tax-treatment-legislative-history/ (last 
visited Jan. 3, 2019) (noting that section 41 was extended fifteen times until it was made permanent 
in 2015). 
 215.  GARY GUENTHER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 31181, RESEARCH TAX CREDIT: 
CURRENT LAW AND POLICY ISSUES FOR THE 114TH CONGRESS Summary (2015), 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL31181.pdf (noting that “[s]ince its enactment in mid-1981, the credit 
has been extended 16 times and significantly modified 5 times”). 
 216.  See Yair Holtzman, U.S. Research and Development Tax Credit, CPA J. (Oct. 2017), 
https://www.cpajournal.com/2017/10/30/u-s-research-development-tax-credit/. 
 217.  See I.R.C. § 41(a)(1)–(2) (2018); see also Crimm, supra note 214, at 1058–59.  The base 
amount is the “product of (A) the fixed-base percentage, and (B) the average annual gross receipts 
of the taxpayer for the [four] taxable years preceding the taxable year for which the credit is being 
determined.”  Id. § 41(c)(1). 
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section 197, which allows taxpayers to amortize the purchase price of intan-
gible assets, such as patents and copyrights, over a fifteen-year period.218 
Since its temporary adoption in 1981, the section 41 R&E credit has 
been so heavily employed by industry that it resulted in $10.4 billion in for-
gone federal revenue in 2016 and is projected to cost the federal government 
$12.7 billion in 2020.219  After the Code section was made permanent in 
2015, Congress further inflated its value by allowing the research credit to 
offset payroll tax obligations of qualifying small businesses (“QSBs”).220  
QSBs can now use up to $250,000 of R&E tax credit to satisfy their payroll 
tax liability.221 
C.  The Effect of U. S. Innovation Tax Policy 
Congress adopted Internal Revenue Code sections 174 and 1235 in the 
mid-twentieth century to bolster innovation and better govern intellectual 
property from a tax perspective, at a time when the Supreme Court was re-
peatedly noting the public purpose of innovation.  Innovation tax policy 
changed very little from 1954 until the third industrial revolution arrived in 
the 1980s.  In 1981, Congress adopted the massively expensive section 41 
R&E tax credit to create “economic growth” and “stimulate productivity and 
innovation.”222  The legislative history focuses solely on the economic pur-
pose of section 41 and makes no mention of the social purposes or benefits 
of innovation.  The addition and ultimate permanency of the section 41 R&E 
tax credit reflects a shift in innovation tax policy goals.  The focus is no 
longer both economic progress and knowledge spillover; by the 1980s, eco-
nomic stimulus eclipsed the social benefits of innovation. 
The focus on economic stimulus to the detriment of public interest man-
ifested again in the fourth industrial revolution.  In 2015, Congress amended 
                                                          
 218.  See Id. § 197(a); see also James E. Tierney, Reassessing Sales and Liquidations of Part-
nership Interests after the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, 1 FLA. TAX REV. 681, 682 
(1994). 
 219.  See JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, JCX-3-17, ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES 
FOR FISCAL YEARS 2016–2020, at 29 (2017) (adding the tax expenditure projections for section 41 
for corporations ($9.4 billion in 2016 and $11.4 billion in 2020) to that for individuals ($1.0 billion 
in 2016 and $1.3 billion in 2020)).   
 220.  See I.R.C. §§ 41(h), 3111(f); see also Jaime Park, David Culp & Tyrone Montague, Re-
search Credit Made Permanent and New Potential Abilities to Use Credit to Offset AMT and Pay-
roll Taxes, KPMG: WHAT’S NEWS IN TAX (Feb. 15, 2016), https://home.kpmg.com/con-
tent/dam/kpmg/pdf/2016/02/tnf-us-068-feb15-2016.pdf.  
 221.  See I.R.C. §§ 41(h)(4)(B)(i), 3111(f). 
 222.  See JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 213, at 17. 
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section 41 to allow QSBs to apply R&E tax credits to offset payroll tax obli-
gations.223  This provision promotes innovation at the direct expense of fund-
ing the U.S. social safety net.  Tax law changes since 1980 and their legisla-
tive history suggest that disharmony is emerging between employment tax 
policy and innovation tax policy. 
Innovation tax policy should honor both economic progress and public 
welfare.224  Inventions provide social value; the U.S. patent system improves 
social welfare and economic vitality with innovations that would otherwise 
not exist absent governmental protection and regulation.225  Tax incentives 
should enhance social welfare by stimulating industry research towards ad-
vancements that have yet to be discovered.226  However, improving social 
welfare through innovation must extend beyond the application of invention 
to consumers’ daily lives.227  As one scholar notes, deeper issues of “health, 
safety, education, homelessness, crime prevention, environmental protection, 
racial and gender discrimination, and inequality in economic opportunity” 
must be considered.228  U.S. innovation tax policy has moved away from ad-
vancing public welfare, instead incentivizing companies to continue their 
R&D at the expense of social safety net funding.  The resulting disconnect 
between two separate tax policies of employment and innovation is further 
imperiling the U.S. social safety net system, thus requiring an examination 
of how to better harmonize the two through the lens of sustainability. 
IV.  HARMONIZING INNOVATION AND EMPLOYMENT TAX POLICY 
THROUGH SUSTAINABILITY 
As shown in Parts I–III, automation innovation in the fourth industrial 
revolution is becoming so pervasive that it threatens to undermine the U.S. 
social safety net.229  Maintaining their current structure, the Medicare trust 
                                                          
 223.  See JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, JCX-144-15, TECHNICAL EXPLANATION OF THE 
PROTECTING AMERICANS FROM TAX HIKES ACT OF 2015, HOUSE AMENDMENT #2 TO THE SENATE 
AMENDMENT TO H.R. 2029 (RULES COMMITTEE PRINT 114–40) 30 (2015), 
https://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=startdown&id=4861 (stating that “Under the provi-
sion, for taxable years beginning after December 31, 2015, a qualified small business may elect for 
any taxable year to claim a certain amount of its research credit as a payroll tax credit against its 
employer OASDI liability . . . .”). 
 224.   See Brett M. Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 257, 259–
261 (2007) (discussing social and economic spillover effects of innovation); see also Shaun P. Ma-
haffy, The Case for Tax: A Comparative Approach to Innovation Policy, 123 YALE L. J. 812, 819–
20 (2013) (noting reasoning for subsidizing innovation). 
 225.  See Mahaffy, supra note 224. 
 226.  Id. 
 227.  See Peter Lee, Social Innovation, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. 1, 9 (2014). 
 228.  Id.  
 229.  See infra Parts I–III. 
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fund will run out of funding in six years (2026),230 and the Social Security 
trust fund will run out of funding in fourteen years (2034).231  Portions of 
Medicare already outpace the employment tax revenues that support them.232  
With an aging population and a dramatic decrease in the number of workers 
per beneficiary during the last half century,233 the current funding structure 
of Medicare and Social Security is unsustainable.234  The aforementioned 
revenue and expense estimates do not account for the projected levels of job 
automation.235  Fourth industrial revolution trends suggest that the presently 
fraying U.S. social safety net may be stretched past the breaking point.236 
The U.S. social safety net is fraying in part because neither employment 
tax nor innovation policy are effectively pursuing their original social goals.  
Employment tax policy never contemplated the extent and rapid arrival of 
automation substitution,237 and the employment tax structure funding the so-
cial safety net cannot survive without significant revision.238  Employment 
tax, in its current form, is insufficiently robust to adjust to automation substi-
tution.239  Simply put, employment tax is in danger of being incapable of 
fulfilling its original social purpose.240  For innovation policy, the focus has 
changed from the twin goals of social benefit and economic stimulus, to the 
pursuit of primarily economic goals.241  As economic goals have eclipsed the 
importance of social goals, innovation policy no longer works in concert with 
                                                          
 230.  See Robert Pear, Medicare’s Trust Fund Is Set to Run Out in 8 Years. Social Security, 16, 
N.Y. TIMES (Jun. 5, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/05/us/politics/medicare-social-secu-
rity-finances.html; see also THE BDS. OF TRS., FED. HOSP. INS. & FED. SUPPLEMENTARY MED. INS. 
TR. FUNDS, 2018 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE BOARDS OF TRUSTEES OF THE FEDERAL HOSPITAL 
INSURANCE AND FEDERAL SUPPLEMENTARY MEDICAL INSURANCE TRUST FUNDS 7 (2018), 
https://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Statistics-Trends-and-Reports/Re-
portsTrustFunds/Downloads/TR2018.pdf [hereinafter MEDICARE REPORT 2018]. 
 231.  See THE BD. OF TRS., FED. OLD-AGE AND SURVIVORS INS. & FED. DISABILITY INS. TR. 
FUNDS, THE 2018 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE FEDERAL OLD-AGE AND 
SURVIVORS INSURANCE AND FEDERAL DISABILITY INSURANCE TRUST FUNDS 5 (2018), 
https://www.ssa.gov/oact/tr/2018/tr2018.pdf (predicting trust fund depletion in 2034). 
 232.  See MEDICARE REPORT 2018, supra note 230, at 23 (noting expected outlays are to surpass 
GDP and payroll tax growth). 
 233.  See Pear, supra note 230 (noting reasons for the long-term financial problems as decreasing 
workers per beneficiary and an aging population). 
 234.   See id. (quoting Alex M. Azar II, the Secretary of Health and Human Services and a trustee 
of Medicare and Social Security stating: “The current trajectories in health spending are both un-
sustainable and unmatched by increases in quality”). 
 235.  See Acemoglu & Restrepo, supra note 88, at 1.  
 236.  See supra Sections I, II.B. 
 237.  See supra Section II.B. 
 238.  See supra text accompanying notes 230–234. 
 239.  See id.  
 240.  See supra Section II.A.1–2. 
 241.  See supra Section III.A–C. 
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employment tax policy.  Indeed, insofar as innovation policy fosters automa-
tion substitution to the detriment of the social safety net, it may undermine 
employment tax policy. 
Reforming employment and innovation tax policies must begin by refo-
cusing these policies toward their goals.  To that end, this Article suggests an 
alternative approach to tax policy analysis.242  Prior approaches to tax policy 
analysis offer helpful insights to tax, but the most common approaches have 
not rigorously interrogated the fundamental purpose of tax provisions, indi-
vidually or in concert, nor have these approaches required in any regular or 
systematic way tax provisions to remain true to their goals.243  Here, this Ar-
ticle seeks to harmonize two areas of the law that have compatible goals,244 
yet do not work in concert. 
In this Part, we first explore the factors that permit ongoing disharmony 
in tax analysis generally, and in employment tax and innovation tax policies 
specifically.245  Noting that current approaches to tax policy analysis provide 
opportunity for disharmony, we suggest using established and accepted prin-
ciples of sustainability to reform these policies.246  We make the case that the 
attributes of sustainability can assist in harmonizing disparate tax policies.247  
Finally, we apply a sustainable tax approach to employment tax and innova-
tion tax proposals in an effort to bring them into concert.248 
A.  Tax Analysis, Disharmony, and Macro Effects 
In the thirty years since the major tax overhaul of 1986,249 Congress has 
most often adopted tax law incrementally.250  There have been a few sizable 
tax bills in the intervening decades, but comprehensive and concerted over-
haul has not been undertaken in a holistic way.251  While there are benefits to 
                                                          
 242.  See infra Section IV.B. 
 243.  See infra Section IV.A. 
 244.  See supra text accompanying notes 237–241. 
 245.  See infra Section IV.A. 
 246.  See infra Section IV.B. 
 247.  See infra Section IV.B. 
 248.  See infra Section IV.C. 
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 251.  See, e.g., Major Enacted Tax Legislation, 1990–1999, TAX POL’Y CTR., https://www.tax-
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Legislation, 2000–2009, TAX POL’Y CTR., https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/laws-proposals/major-
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incremental legal revision,252 legislation adopted in such a manner can permit 
policy to stray from its motivations. 
Similarly, tax law is often analyzed on a micro level in academia.  This 
approach permits scholars to take deep dives into the nuances of provisions 
or groups of provisions.253  To be sure, any tax lawyer or scholar will affirm 
that details matter enormously in tax;254 however, a narrow or deep dive ap-
proach does not always permit the effects of the tax code, as a whole, to be 
seen on a macro level.  Narrow approaches to tax analysis may not illuminate 
how provisions of the Code struggle to find harmony with each other, other 
legal provisions, or larger economic trends.  Indeed, we argue that these 
macro effects have been ignored for employment tax and innovation tax pol-
icies.255 
Compounding the effects of this approach to tax policy analysis is the 
limited scholarship that interrogates foundational principles of tax and re-
quires tax to be placed in the context of broader philosophical frameworks.256  
We are not the first to make this observation.257  In their book, The Myth of 
Ownership: Taxes and Justice, Professors Murphy and Nagel expressly cri-
tique tax scholarship, suggesting that its contextual relationship to legal, 
moral, and political theory had not been adequately explored.258  In other 
words, tax scholarship has not been sufficiently connected to the broader con-
text in which it lives.  Murphy and Nagel are critical of tax scholarship’s 
attempts to adopt tax-specific normative concepts.  They point out that com-
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tion with the complexity of the income tax is nothing new.”); David M. Schizer, Frictions as a 
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 255.  See supra Parts II–III. 
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3–8 (2002). 
 257.  See id. 
 258.  Id. 
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mon tax concepts such as “vertical equity, horizontal equity, the benefit prin-
ciple, equal sacrifice, [and] ability to pay” do not “adequately capture the 
considerations that ought to enter into the normative assessment of tax pol-
icy.”259  Murphy and Nagel are not alone in their criticism of tax policy anal-
ysis; similar criticism was noted three decades before they published their 
book.260 
Although this weakness in tax scholarship has been noted by Murphy, 
Nagel, and others,261 it has not yet been remedied on a broadly accepted ba-
sis.262  To that end, we suggest a different approach.263  A superior approach 
to tax scholarship would (1) require tax to identify and remain faithful to 
normative foundations, (2) integrate tax policy, provisions, and goals more 
holistically with other tax policies as well as other legal and economic insti-
tutions, and (3) require tax to continually adapt to societal, economic, and 
technological changes destined to occur.264 
It is easy to lose sight of the concept that tax is but one tool in the regu-
latory arsenal.  As Professor Sugin notes, “no tax system, by itself, is capable 
of carrying out a conception of . . . justice, and fairness in government cannot 
be determined by isolating elements of any tax system.”265  Tax must be 
viewed in context with other legal rules and relevant societal norms to under-
stand its full effect and have any chance to effectively reform it.266  In subse-
quent work to The Myth of Ownership, Professor Murphy continues to argue 
that, only when viewing tax in its broader context with other rules and norms, 
can it be determined whether tax fulfills foundational principles.267  Indeed, 
he notes that “[a] tax scheme will be just if it finds its place in a just set of 
economic and legal institutions.  Economic and legal institutions, as a system, 
will be just depending on how well they secure certain values—values such 
                                                          
 259.  Id. at 7–8. 
 260.  See Lawrence Zelenak, The Myth of Pretax Income, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2261, 2262 (2003) 
(reviewing LIAM MURPHY & THOMAS NAGEL, THE MYTH OF OWNERSHIP: TAXES AND JUSTICE 
(2002)) (citing CARL S. SHOUP, PUBLIC FINANCE 577–78 (1969)) (noting similar criticism by Carl 
Shoup).  
 261.  See Jeffrey A. Schoenblum, Myth of Ownership/Myth of Government, 22 VA. TAX REV. 
555, 586–87 (2003) (reviewing LIAM MURPHY & THOMAS NAGEL, THE MYTH OF OWNERSHIP: 
TAXES AND JUSTICE (2002)) (noting that “many of the dominant concerns of taxation, such as ver-
tical and horizontal equity and the debate over income versus consumption tax, diminish in im-
portance or even vanish when the focus turns to first principles”).  
 262.  See Karie Davis-Nozemack & Kathryn Kisska-Schulze, Applying Sustainability to Tax, 23 
FLA. TAX. REV. (forthcoming 2020). 
 263.  See infra Section IV.B. 
 264.  See infra Section IV.B. 
 265.  Linda Sugin, Theories of Distributive Justice and Limitations on Taxation: What Rawls 
Demands from Tax Systems, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 1991, 1992–93 (2004) 
 266.  See id. 
 267.  See Liam Murphy, Taxes, Property, Justice, 1 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 983, 983 (2005). 
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as liberty, welfare, opportunity, and personal responsibility.”268  The ap-
proach that Murphy recommends—viewing tax in its societal context and in-
terrogating its normative goals269—both motivates and suggests solutions to 
the issues facing the unraveling safety net.  While this informs our thinking, 
it is not sufficient. 
The struggle to adapt and modernize tax policy when societal and eco-
nomic trends arise is just as critical to tax as a lack of broader context and 
foundational unmooring.270  Legal regimes that are static provide certainty, 
but they risk becoming outmoded.  This is a particular concern when tech-
nology and labor market changes move so quickly.  Consequently, an ap-
proach to a tax analysis should address each of those deficiencies.  These 
inquiries are well framed for an analysis based in sustainability.271 
B.  Sustainability as a Superior Approach 
We propose a sustainability approach to tax policy analysis because 
“[t]he fundamental cause of the current crisis in sustainability is the industri-
alization that followed the industrial revolution and the rapid economic 
growth it fostered.“272  We also propose using a sustainability approach be-
cause its attributes directly address weaknesses in prior analyses.273  Sustain-
ability can be viewed as a “framework for managing change.”274  More criti-
cally important, however, sustainability asks foundational, normative 
questions275 and requires a multi-disciplinary approach focusing on long-
term solutions and adjusting to changes in technology, society, and the econ-
omy.276 
From its inception, sustainability has asked whether a system “meets the 
needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations 
                                                          
 268.  Id. 
 269.  See id. 
 270.  See infra Section IV.B. 
 271.  See infra Section IV.B. 
 272.  Hiroshi Komiyama & Kazuhiko Takeuchi, Sustainability Science: Building a New Disci-
pline, 1 SUSTAINABILITY. SCI. 1, 3–4 (2006). 
 273.  See supra Section IV.A. 
 274.  Keith H. Hirokawa, Saving Sustainability, 46 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10151, 
10151 (2016). 
 275.  See Davis-Nozemack & Kisska-Schulze, supra note 262.  
 276.  See infra text accompanying notes 277–304. 
 
2020] HUMANS VS. ROBOTS 1045 
to meet their own needs.”277  This question is sustainability’s guiding princi-
ple; it directs the entry into thinking sustainably.278  This question also invites 
a dual normative and analytical enquiry.279  In other words, it asks what needs 
should be met and asks to what extent we are meeting them.280  A dual-
pronged normative and analytical approach requires significant work but 
promises robustness in its outcomes. 
Many assume that sustainability only involves environmental protec-
tionism;281 however, sustainability is much broader than climate and resource 
issues.282  While there is an entire body of research across multiple disciplines 
involving sustainability,283 for the purposes of harmonizing the employment 
and innovation tax policies in this paper, a few points are most critical. 
                                                          
 277.  Compare Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development: Our Com-
mon Future, 24, U.N. Doc. A/42/427 (Mar. 20, 1987) (providing a definition of and laying the 
foundation for sustainable development), https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/docu-
ments/5987our-common-future.pdf [hereinafter United Nations, Development Report], with R.K. 
TURNER, SUSTAINABLE ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE 12 (1988) 
(defining sustainable growth differently than the United Nations as “an acceptable rate of growth in 
per-capita real incomes without depleting the national capital asset stock or the natural environmen-
tal asset stock.”). 
 278.  See United Nations, Development Report, supra note 277; see also Hirokawa, supra note 
274, at 10152. 
 279.  See Egon Becker, Thomas Jahn & Immanuel Stiess, Exploring Uncommon Ground: Sus-
tainability and the Social Sciences, in SUSTAINABILITY AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES: A CROSS-
DISCIPLINARY APPROACH TO INTEGRATING ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS INTO 
THEORETICAL REORIENTATION 1–22 (Egon Becker & Thomas Jahn eds., 1999); see also Erich 
Griessler & Beate Littig, Social Sustainability: A Catchword between Political Pragmatism and 
Social Theory, 8 INT’L J. OF SUSTAINABLE DEV. 65–79 (2005).  
 280.  See SUSTAINABILITY: CRITICAL CONCEPTS IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 382–83 (Michael 
Redclift ed., 2005) (discussing the normative and analytical aspects, among others, of sustainabil-
ity). 
 281.  See Dave Newport, Thomas Chesnes, & Angela S. Lindner, The “Environmental Sustain-
ability” Problem: Ensuring that Sustainability Stands on Three Legs, 4 INT’L J. OF SUSTAINABILITY 
IN HIGHER ED. 357, 357 (2003) (discussing environmental primacy). 
 282.  See Hirokawa, supra note 274, at 10152 (noting environmental and economic outcomes as 
“complementary policy objectives”). 
 283.  See, e.g., BLUE RIBBON TASK FORCE ON SUSTAINABLE DIG. PRES. & ACCESS, 
SUSTAINABLE ECONOMICS FOR A DIGITAL PLANET: ENSURING LONG-TERM ACCESS TO DIGITAL 
INFORMATION 9 (2010), http://brtf.sdsc.edu/biblio/BRTF_Final_Report.pdf (linking sustainability 
and information management); Stefan Baumgärtner & Martin Quaas, What is Sustainability Eco-
nomics?, 69 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 3, 445–50 (2010) (linking sustainability and economics); William 
R. Blackburn, The Practice of Sustainability at Colleges and Universities, 46 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS 
& ANALYSIS 10394, 10394 (2016) (noting the relationship between sustainability and higher edu-
cation); Wynn Calder & Richard M. Clugston, Progress Toward Sustainability in Higher Educa-
tion, 33 ENVTL. L. REP. 10003, 10003 (2003) (using sustainability for higher education issues); 
Iveta Cherneva, The Business Case for Sustainable Finance: Beyond Public Relations, Ethics, and 
Philanthropy, 36 FLETCHER F. WORLD. AFF. 93, 96 (2012) (linking sustainability and finance); 
Virginia Harper Ho, Sustainable Finance & China’s Green Credit Reforms: A Test Case for Bank 
Monitoring of Environmental Risk, 51 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 609, 609 (2018); Mozaffar Khan, 
George Serafeim & Aaron Yoon, Corporate Sustainability: First Evidence on Materiality, 91 ACCT. 
REV. 1697–1724 (2016) (linking sustainability, accounting, and firm performance); David Millon, 
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First, sustainability is much broader and implicates far more than envi-
ronmentalism.284  There are various approaches to understanding sustainabil-
ity, but one of the most widely accepted is the three pillars approach.285  Un-
der this approach, sustainability analysis looks to (1) social development, (2) 
economic development, as well as (3) environmental development to under-
stand whether a proposal will meet the needs of the present without compro-
mising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.286  Much 
focus in sustainability is on the environmental pillar because the effects of 
climate change threaten future irreversible damage;287 however, the three pil-
lars are interdependent.288  Addressing problems under sustainability requires 
considering the effects on each of the pillars and necessitates a balanced ap-
proach.289 
                                                          
Two Models of Corporate Social Responsibility, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 523, 523 (2011) (exam-
ining sustainability and corporate governance); Stephen Kim Park & Gerlinde Berger-Walliser, A 
Firm-Driven Approach to Global Governance and Sustainability, 52 AM. BUS. L. J. 255, 255 (2015) 
(linking sustainability and firm governance); Stephen Kim Park, Investors as Regulators: Green 
Bonds and the Governance Challenges of the Sustainable Finance Revolution, 54 STAN. J. INT’L L. 
1, 6 (2018) (linking sustainability and finance); Tara J. Radin, Stakeholders and Sustainability: An 
Argument for Responsible Corporate Decision-Making, 31 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 
363, 367 (2007) (linking sustainability and management). 
 284.  See KENT E. PORTNEY, SUSTAINABILITY 6 (2015) (discussing the development of sustain-
ability, including the three pillars approach). 
 285.  See Robert W. Kates, Thomas M. Parris & Anthony A. Leiserowitz, What Is Sustainable 
Development? Goals, Indicators, Values, and Practice, 47 ENV’T: SCI. & POL’Y FOR SUSTAINABLE 
DEV. 8, 12 (2005),  (providing historical context for sustainable development and discussing the 
three pillars approach to sustainability). 
 286.  See PORTNEY, supra note 284; see also Kates, Parris & Leiserowitz, supra note 285.  
 287.  See, e.g., Markku Lehtonen, The Environmental-Social Interface of Sustainable Develop-
ment: Capabilities, Social Capital, Institutions, 49 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 199, 199–200 (2004) (dis-
cussing the relationship amongst the three pillars); Gerald Rebitzer, David Hunkeler & Olivier Jol-
liett, LCC—The Economic Pillar of Sustainability: Methodology and Application to Wastewater 
Treatment, 22 ENVTL. PROGRESS 241, 241 (2003) (noting the importance of each of the three pil-
lars). 
 288.  See Robert B. Gibson, Beyond the Pillars: Sustainability Assessment as a Framework for 
Effective Integration of Social, Economic and Ecological Considerations in Significant Decision-
Making, in TOOLS, TECHNIQUES AND APPROACHES FOR SUSTAINABILITY: COLLECTED WRITINGS 
IN ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT POLICY AND MANAGEMENT 389, 391 (William R. Sheate ed., 
2010) (discussing the relationship amongst the three pillars); Susan M. Opp & Kyle L. Saunders, 
Pillar Talk: Local Sustainability Initiatives and Policies in the United States—Finding Evidence of 
the “Three E’s”: Economic Development, Environmental Protection, and Social Equity, 49 URB. 
AFF. REV. 678, 681 (2012) (discussing the interaction amongst the three pillars); see also Ralph 
Hansmann, Harald A. Mieg & Peter Frischknecht, Principal Sustainability Components: Empirical 
Analysis of Synergies Between the Three Pillars of Sustainability, 19 INT’L J. SUSTAINABLE DEV. 
& WORLD ECOLOGY 451, 451 (2012) (exploring the relationship amongst the pillars); David Hess, 
The Three Pillars of Corporate Social Reporting as New Governance Regulation: Disclosure, Dia-
logue, and Development, 18 BUS. ETHICS Q. 447, 449–50 (2008) (noting the pillars in sustainabil-
ity).  
 289.  See Gibson, supra note 288, at 391.  
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A multi-dimensional, or three pillars, approach is appropriate to address 
issues that are complex and dramatic in scale.290  No single discipline can 
solve issues as multifaceted and entrenched as climate change.291  Similarly, 
no single discipline is likely to solve other multifaceted and entrenched prob-
lems, like an eroding social safety net and dramatic changes in labor markets.  
Sustainability integrates knowledge, theories, and analysis from as many dis-
ciplines as can contribute.292  An approach that acknowledges the need for 
contribution from so many scholars can be daunting;293 however, scholarly 
contribution must be broad and diverse to address complex, interdisciplinary 
questions.  The need for collaboration amongst academic disciplines, rather 
than a single-discipline approach, can strengthen and add robustness to solu-
tions.294  Such collaboration presents possibilities for knowledge spillover 
effects. 
Sustainability is radical in its approach to the timeline for analysis.  The 
guiding principle of sustainability—whether a solution “meets the needs of 
the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet 
their own needs”295—inherently requires long-term thinking.  This question 
does not permit scholars to contemplate solutions that address only current 
needs.  This question acknowledges an implicit conflict amongst the re-
sources we need for today and what we (and others) may need for tomor-
row.296  Sustainability also provides resources to people who do not yet exist, 
those in future generations.  This is an unusual approach for any discipline, 
let alone for tax.297  Nonetheless, the future-focus of sustainability is critical 
to its ability to craft lasting and livable solutions.298 
                                                          
 290.  See Marilu Hastings, Foreword to EXAMINING INTERDISCIPLINARY SUSTAINABILITY 
INSTITUTES AT MAJOR RESEARCH UNIVERSITIES: INNOVATIONS IN CROSS-CAMPUS & CROSS-
DISCIPLINARY MODELS i (2017). 
 291.  See Hirokawa, supra note 274, at 10155 (noting that “environmental, economic, and social 
considerations cannot be accomplished when viewed in isolation”). 
 292.  See Gibson, supra note 288 (discussing integrative aspects of sustainability).  
 293.  See id.; see also Komiyama & Takeuchi, supra note 272, at 3–4. 
 294.  See Emma Partridge, “Social Sustainability”: A Useful Theoretical Framework? (Sept. 28. 
2005) (unpublished manuscript, presented at the 2005 Australasian Political Science Association 
Annual Conference) (noting the integrative ability of sustainability) (on file with author). 
 295.  United Nations, Development Report, supra note 277. 
 296.  See Sudhir Anand & Amartya Sen, Human Development and Economic Sustainability, 28 
WORLD DEV. 2029, 2030 (2000) (discussing equity between generations); Amartya Sen, The Ends 
and Means of Sustainability, 14 J. HUM. DEV. & CAPABILITIES 6, 6 (2013) (noting justice issues 
amongst generations). 
 297.  See Anand & Sen, supra note 296, at 2030 (noting the need for various generations to share 
resources). 
 298.  Magnus Boström, A Missing Pillar? Challenges in Theorizing and Practicing Social Sus-
tainability: Introduction to the Special Issue, 8 SUSTAINABILITY: SCI., PRACTICE & POL’Y. 3–14 
(2012).   
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Sustainability also inherently embraces change.299  Sustainability 
acknowledges that today’s status quo will change.300  Technology, society, 
and the economy continually evolve.  Because of this acknowledgement, sus-
tainability seeks solutions, models, and theories that adapt to change.301  Sus-
tainability demands adaptability in its component parts because the complex 
and interconnected problems it addresses are also constantly evolving.302  To 
ensure adaptability, it presents as an iterative process.303  Sustainability acts 
like a dynamic system that cycles through asking normative questions to set 
goals, measuring whether the goals have been met, and repeating the cycle 
again.304 
A sustainability analysis is appropriate in addressing the fraying social 
safety net because, as economist and philosopher Amartya Sen has noted, “it 
is only now that humankind itself and its economic activity has reached a 
scale that is potentially big enough to threaten the welfare prospects of future 
generations.”305  The impending collision of automation substitution and so-
cial safety net funding is economic activity on a scale big enough to threaten 
future generations.  The current collision of employment tax and innovation 
tax policies sets up a classic intergenerational conflict common in sustaina-
bility issues.306  With automation substitution and social safety net funding, 
the social and economic pillars are also in conflict but must be harmonized.307 
                                                          
 299.  See Hirokawa, supra note 274, at 10154 (noting sustainability as “pluralistic, evolving, and 
adaptive”); LESLIE PAUL THIELE, SUSTAINABILITY 4 (2016) (noting sustainability’s relationship to 
adaptation).   
 300.  See Hirokawa, supra note 274, at 10154 (noting the need to incorporate “evolving needs”).  
 301.  Komiyama & Takeuchi, supra note 272, at 5 (noting the importance of change manage-
ment in sustainability). 
 302.  See id. 
 303.  See Efrat Eizenberg & Yosef Jabareen, Social Sustainability: A New Conceptual Frame-
work, 9 SUSTAINABILITY 68 (2017) (noting the use of process in sustainability); see also THIELE, 
supra note 299 (noting that sustainability uses a systems approach to fulfilling its goals).  
 304.  See Gibson, supra note 288 (providing examples of iterative decisionmaking in sustaina-
bility); see also PORTNEY, supra note 284 (noting the process and systems nature of sustainability); 
Griessler & Littig, supra note 279 (describing an iterative process). 
 305.  ERIC NEUMAYER, WEAK VERSUS STRONG SUSTAINABILITY: EXPLORING THE LIMITS OF 
TWO OPPOSING PARADIGMS 15 (4th ed. 2013). 
 306.  See Hansmann, Mieg & Frischknecht, supra note 288, at 458.  
 307.  See Anand & Sen, supra note 296, at 2039 (noting the relationship amongst the pillars to 
improve the human condition). 
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C.  A Sustainability Approach to Employment and Innovation Tax 
Policies  
U.S. innovation policy has veered away from advancing social goals308 
and promoted R&D at the expense of social safety net funding.309  Automa-
tion substitution in the fourth industrial revolution further endangers the via-
bility of social safety net programs supported by employment tax policy.310  
Employment tax policy goals cannot be fulfilled if undermined by the pro-
motion of innovation.311  The resulting disharmony amongst employment and 
innovation tax policies is imperiling the U.S. social safety net system, requir-
ing an examination of how better to balance the two.312  A sustainable taxa-
tion approach to U.S. employment and innovation tax policies could help; a 
sustainable taxation approach requires an interdisciplinary examination to 
create complementary tax policies aimed at supporting the kind of society we 
want to sustain.313 
Existing tax literature has not specifically focused on introducing meth-
odologies to harmonize employment and innovation tax policies so they each 
remain faithful to their original social goals.314  As such, a new approach to 
tax policy analysis that asks fundamental, normative questions and addresses 
intergenerational equity is vital.315  Introducing a sustainability approach to 
taxation invites tax scholars to engage in interdisciplinary collaboration to 
explore this proposed analysis.316  Using the lens of sustainability to harmo-
nize tax policy will not displace other approaches currently in place but, in-
stead, is suitably interdisciplinary and robust enough to incorporate historical 
lessons.317  As explained above, current approaches to tax scholarship are not 
sufficient to tackle the issues we face; however, prior work in taxation is very 
valuable and can be integrated within and support a sustainable framework. 
1.  Applying Sustainability to Employment Tax Proposals 
A sustainability tax analysis must begin with the question of whether 
U.S. employment and innovation policies “meet[] the needs of the present 
without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own 
                                                          
 308.  See supra Sections III.A, C. 
 309.  See supra Sections III.A, C. 
 310.  See supra Section II.B. 
 311.  See supra Part II–III. 
 312.  See infra Section IV.C.1–2. 
 313.  See supra Section IV.B. 
 314.  See supra Section IV.A.  
 315.  See supra text accompanying notes 272–280, 295–298. 
 316.  See supra text accompanying notes 281–294. 
 317.  See supra text accompanying notes 299–304. 
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needs.”318  As explained above, Medicare and Social Security are currently 
funded but are predicted to become insolvent in the next six to fourteen 
years.319  This funding structure meets neither the needs of the present nor 
future generations and is likely compounded by projected levels of job auto-
mation.320 
The normative underpinning of employment tax has been long estab-
lished and was explored in Section II.A.321  The Social Security Act was to 
provide welfare assistance, poverty prevention, financial security for the ag-
ing, economic stability, and labor force stabilization.322  Program insolvency 
jeopardizes these public policy goals for current and future beneficiaries.323  
Several reforms to address program insolvency have been proposed, includ-
ing (1) increasing wage caps for FICA and FUTA to generate additional pay-
roll tax revenue, (2) use of chained consumer price index (CPI) to allow ben-
efit payments to more easily adapt to economic trends, and (3) use of post-
mortem austerity to recoup benefits from wealthy beneficiaries who do not 
require governmental support.324  We apply a sustainability analysis to deter-
mine their viability.325 
One of the most popular proposals has been limiting erosion of the so-
cial security wage base by lifting the cap on taxable Social Security wages.326  
Social Security wage base erosion has not been addressed since 1983.327  Be-
cause the Social Security and Medicare Trustees have reported impending 
insolvency of the trust funds to the public regularly for many years,328 public 
opinion sees merit in such a proposal and is in favor of increasing employ-
ment tax contributions to prevent insolvency.329  Similarly, some have also 
                                                          
 318.  See United Nations, Development Report, supra note 277.   
 319.   See MEDICARE REPORT 2018, supra note 230.  
 320.  See Acemoglu & Restrepo, supra note 88.  
 321.  See supra Section II.A. 
 322.  See Altman, supra note 114; DeWitt, supra note 109; Price, supra note 115.  
 323.  See supra Section II.B. 
 324.  See infra text accompanying notes 326–348. 
 325.  See infra text accompanying notes 326–348. 
 326.  See Policy Basics: Top Ten Facts About Social Security, supra note 12. 
 327.  Social Security Amendments Act of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-21, 97 Stat. 65 (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 418); see also Lewis D. Solomon & Geoffrey A. Barrow, Privatization of 
Social Security: A Legal and Policy Analysis, 5 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y, 9, 15 (1995) (discussing 
the legislative history of the 1983 amendments). 
 328.  See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, Fact Sheet: 2019 Social Security and Medicare 
Trustees Reports’ (Apr. 22, 2019), https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm665 (summa-
rizing 2019 trustee reports, including insolvency dates). 
 329.  See Social Security, GALLUP, https://news.gallup.com/poll/1693/social-security.aspx (last 
visited Feb. 29, 2020) (finding that, in 2005, 2010, and 2015, a majority of Americans would rather 
raise social security taxes than limit benefits); AARP, SOCIAL SECURITY 80TH ANNIVERSARY 
SURVEY REPORT: PUBLIC OPINION TRENDS 18 (2015), https://www.aarp.org/research/topics/eco-
nomics/info-2015/social-security-80th-anniversary-report.html (finding that “four in five adults age 
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suggested raising the low wage base for FUTA.330  Both of these proposals 
have the benefits of increasing employment tax revenues without undermin-
ing the established goals of the programs.  These reforms are not particularly 
adaptive, however.  One-time wage base increases or rate increases are an-
other example of incremental change that does not adapt to future societal or 
economic changes.  Depending upon the size of base or rate increase, these 
one-time changes also do not necessarily balance the needs of the present 
with the needs of the future. 
Other often discussed proposals, like the use of the chained Consumer 
Price Index (often noted as “C-CPI”) instead of the Consumer Price Index 
for Urban Wage Earners and Clerical Workers (“CPI-W”) to set program 
benefits331 or increase the ages of eligibility for Social Security and Medi-
care,332 are also likely to address the programs’ insolvency.  The use of 
chained CPI is inherently more adaptive than the currently applied CPI 
measures, because chained CPI is calculated monthly as opposed to biannu-
ally.333  While more adaptive to on-the-ground economic changes, use of 
chained CPI for program benefits is predicted to slow inflation adjustments 
                                                          
18-29 (81%) agree that they are willing to contribute more now for a more secure retirement, com-
pared to approximately two in three or less among adults age 30-49 (68%) and 50-64 (57%)”). 
 330.  See Unemployment Insurance: An Overview of the Challenges and Strengths of Today’s 
System: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Human Res. of the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 114th 
Cong. 7 (2016) (testimony of Judith M. Conti, Federal Advocacy Coordinator, National Employ-
ment Law Project) (proposing increase to FUTA wage base to $59,000 and indexing to Social Se-
curity); Christopher J. O’Leary, Restoring Unemployment Insurance as Social Insurance, W.E. 
UPJOHN INST. EMP. RES. (Nov. 7, 2018), https://research.upjohn.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?arti-
cle=1058&context=presentations (proposing indexing FUTA wage base to Social Security wage 
base); Increase Taxes That Finance the Federal Share of the Unemployment Insurance System, 
CONG. BUDGET OFF. (Dec. 13, 2018), https://www.cbo.gov/budget-options/2018/54809 (analyzing 
the proposal to expand FUTA wage base from $7000 to $40,000 and index the wage base). 
 331.  See Emily Brandon, How the Chained CPI Affects Social Security Payments, U.S. NEWS 
& WORLD REP. (Apr. 29, 2013, 9:05 AM), https://money.usnews.com/money/retirement/arti-
cles/2013/04/29/how-the-chained-cpi-affects-social-security-payments (reporting on chained CPI 
for Social Security benefits); Using the Chained CPI in the Tax Code: Will Social Security Be Next?, 
NAT’L COMMITTEE TO PRESERVE SOC. SECURITY & MEDICARE (Nov. 14, 2017), 
https://www.ncpssm.org/documents/general-archives-2017/using-chained-cpi-tax-code-will-so-
cial-security-next (discussing the use of chained CPI).  
 332.  See generally Anya Olsen, Mind the Gap: The Distributional Effects of Raising the Early 
Eligibility Age and Full Retirement Age, 72 SOC. SECURITY BULL., Nov. 2012, at 37, 
https://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/ssb/v72n4/v72n4p37.html.; see also Philip Moeller, Should We 
Raise the Retirement Age for Social Security and Medicare?, PBS NEWSHOUR (Feb. 1, 2017, 3:33 
PM), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/economy/raise-retirement-age-social-security-medicare.   
 333.  Frequently Asked Questions About the Chained Consumer Price Index for All Urban Con-
sumers (C-CPI-U), U.S. BUREAU LABOR STAT., https://www.bls.gov/cpi/additional-re-
sources/chained-cpi-questions-and-answers.htm#Question_4 (last modified Dec. 20, 2019) (“In its 
final form, the C-CPI-U is a monthly chained price index with the expenditure weights varying each 
month.  The CPI-U and CPI-W, on the other hand, are biennial chained price indexes where their 
expenditure weights are updated every two years.”). 
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of Social Security benefits over time.334  While CPI changes are adaptive and 
assist with insolvency, such proposals threaten to undermine the welfare as-
sistance, poverty prevention, economic, and security goals of the programs 
by decreasing benefits received for current and future beneficiaries.  Unlike 
the chained CPI proposals, increasing eligibility age is not adaptive.  Moreo-
ver, age eligibility proposals are also subject to criticism that they undermine 
the public policy goals of the programs. 
Other proposals, such as post-mortem austerity in which beneficiaries 
receive assistance during life but can be disqualified for benefits after death 
based on wealth, offer creative possibilities that could financially shore up 
the programs without undermining the public policy goals for current and 
future beneficiaries.335  Post-mortem austerity is also highly adaptive and bal-
ances the needs of current and future beneficiaries.  Post-mortem austerity is 
the type of social safety net reform that satisfies the issue raised under a sus-
tainability analysis and is more likely to lead to a lasting solution that fulfills 
the needs of the current generation without imperiling the ability of future 
generations to meet their own needs. 
2.  Applying Sustainability to Innovation Tax Proposals 
The normative underpinning of innovation tax, as explored in Section 
III.A,336 has twin goals of increasing economic progress and improving social 
welfare.337  We have criticized innovation tax policy for evolving to prefer 
economic improvements over social welfare gains.338  The trend in innova-
tion tax policy has been to become more generous to business, the primary 
beneficiary of increased credits, deductions, and offsets.339  The federal gov-
ernment has relied on economic studies as rationale for increasing tax subsi-
dies.340  Economic analysis of innovation tax proposals, in many cases, has 
                                                          
 334.  See Using the Chained CPI in the Tax Code, supra note 331. 
 335.  See generally Reid Kress Weisbord, Postmortem Austerity and Entitlement Reform, 71 
STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 132, 132 (2018) (proposing post-mortem austerity for Social Security ben-
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suggested that increasing innovation tax subsidies yields positive (or at least 
not negative) revenue projections.341  In other words, several economic stud-
ies suggest that tax subsidies for innovation pay for themselves.  However, 
an admitted weakness of this work is that tax subsidies can shift “the demand 
curve for innovation outward by subsidizing research and development.”342  
In essence, “if the number of workers in the innovation sector (‘supply’) is 
fixed,” then tax subsidies merely increase demand for these workers and con-
sequently “may simply drive up their wages with no effect on the quantity of 
innovation.”343 
Our primary criticism of this economic analysis is that it is not suffi-
ciently interdisciplinary and does not consider other labor force and employ-
ment tax effects.  Specifically, some studies focus on productivity gains, an 
important and valid measure.344  However, such productivity gains can in-
crease the likelihood of automation substitution, which can intensify pres-
sures on social safety revenue and benefits.  The economic models used, and 
data included in these models, should consider the downstream impact that 
innovation has on the U.S. labor market and hence on employment tax reve-
nues.  Using a single discipline model, such as an economics-only model, 
limits the utility of solutions found in this work and, more importantly, does 
not acknowledge the ramifications of using the work without its broader con-
text.  Just as the usefulness of tax as a discipline is limited when it is siloed 
from interdisciplinary work, the same can be said for economics. 
The use of economic models is critically important to improving and 
refining tax policy.345  These models and their limited view on downstream 
effects, however, are not sufficient evidence on which to base tax policy.  An 
interdisciplinary approach provides nuance for innovation tax models.  The 
appropriate inquiry is how to foster economic development, including 
through innovation, while measuring downstream effects on social programs 
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and providing an adaptive system for pursuing both.  The economics research 
should be considered in light of the twin goals of increasing economic pro-
gress and improving social welfare, and the research should be used to ascer-
tain whether it furthers these goals. 
In addition to a more interdisciplinary examination of innovation tax 
policy, a sustainable approach to innovation tax policy would begin with the 
motivating policies of the legislation itself.346  As we have argued above, 
legislation should remain faithful to its underpinning.347  This underpinning 
can be found often, but not exclusively, in legislative histories.348  Because 
innovation tax policy has strayed from its original social welfare goals, all 
future innovation tax proposals should express motivating goals clearly.  A 
statement of purpose makes it easier to ensure that the legislation’s intended 
effects are realized and consistent with these goals.349  Establishing clear 
goals is the first step towards an iterative and adaptive system.350 
In addition, the effects of innovation tax policy must be measured 
broadly and regularly so as to empower the policy to become more adaptive.  
These measures should examine the downstream effects on the current and 
future labor force.  Such measures can be generated by dynamic and predic-
tive economic models. 
In its current form, innovation tax policy is not sustainable.  We recom-
mend policy and legal changes more consistent with sustainable thinking.  In 
particular, we first recommend that all innovation tax legislation expressly 
state its economic progress and social welfare goals.351  Such a pronounce-
ment is critical to forcing the legislation to remain faithful to these purposes 
as it is incrementally amended over time.  We also recommend that the 
measures used to inform innovation tax law become more interdisciplinary 
and examine downstream effects of the proposals, particularly the effects on 
labor markets and social programs.352  These measures should assist in de-
signing adaptive—as opposed to static—policies that can adjust with new 
technologies and changes in labor markets.  Finally, the goals and measures 
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should also endeavor to consider intergenerational equity effects of current 
law and future proposals.353 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Like the three prior industrial revolutions, the current fourth industrial 
revolution is altering the workplace with machinery advancements.  This rev-
olution is distinguishable from previous industrial revolutions because of the 
speed of innovation improvements and unprecedented human-machine alli-
ances.354  Increased automation is predicted to lead to worker displacement 
across countless industries, in both blue- and white-collar jobs.  This level of 
worker displacement threatens an already fraying social safety net.355  Alt-
hough some have suggested taxing robots to limit the financial impact of au-
tomation substitution, this Article suggests that such a proposal is naïve be-
cause it conceals the underlying tension between employment tax and 
innovation policies.356 
From its inception, the goal of U.S. employment tax policy was to im-
prove social welfare.357  Increased worker displacement caused by automa-
tion substitution could result in society’s inability to meet the benefit de-
mands of Social Security, Medicare, and unemployment that are funded by 
the employment tax.358  The long-term sustainability of these programs is 
already jeopardized, and automation substitution further threatens their via-
bility.359 
Employment tax policy goals cannot be realized if they are undermined 
by the promotion of innovation.  U.S. innovation tax policy evolved from 
general innovation policy to promote both economic progress and social wel-
fare.360  However, innovation tax has shifted in favor of economic progres-
sion at the expense of social safety net funding.361  This deviation from pur-
suit of both twin goals of economic progress and social welfare imperils the 
U.S. social safety net system. 
Current analytical approaches are ill-suited to address the impending so-
cial safety net crisis.  This Article introduces and applies sustainability as a 
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viable approach for harmonizing U.S. employment and innovation tax poli-
cies.362  Sustainability requires an examination of foundational, normative 
questions, integrates interdisciplinary collaboration, embraces long-term so-
lutions, and adapts to an ever-evolving technological society.363  With so little 
scholarly work about sustainable taxation, no comprehensive sustainable tax 
analysis currently exists.  To advance the literature in this arena, we show 
that sustainability can help harmonize employment tax and innovation tax 
policies to repair the fraying social safety net.364 
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